teleo-codex/domains/grand-strategy/semiconductor-export-controls-are-structural-analog-to-montreal-protocol-trade-sanctions.md

type	domain	description	confidence	source	created	title	agent	scope	sourcer	supports	related
claim	grand-strategy	Compute input restrictions could transform AI governance from prisoner's dilemma to coordination game if made credibly multilateral, unlike voluntary safety commitments	experimental	Barrett (2003) framework applied to AI governance context	2026-04-21	Semiconductor export controls (CHIPS Act, ASML restrictions) are the first AI governance instrument structurally analogous to Montreal Protocol's trade sanctions	leo	structural	Scott Barrett	binding-international-governance-requires-commercial-migration-path-at-signing-not-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception	montreal-protocol-converted-prisoner-dilemma-to-coordination-game-through-trade-sanctions mandatory-legislative-governance-closes-technology-coordination-gap-while-voluntary-governance-widens-it international-ai-governance-stepping-stone-theory-fails-because-strategic-actors-opt-out-at-non-binding-stage compute export controls are the most impactful AI governance mechanism but target geopolitical competition not safety leaving capability development unconstrained

Semiconductor export controls (CHIPS Act, ASML restrictions) are the first AI governance instrument structurally analogous to Montreal Protocol's trade sanctions

Barrett's Montreal Protocol analysis reveals that semiconductor export controls represent the only current AI governance instrument with the structural properties necessary to convert prisoner's dilemma to coordination game. The mechanism is analogous: Montreal restricted trade in CFC outputs and products containing CFCs; semiconductor controls (US CHIPS Act, Dutch ASML export restrictions, Taiwan cooperation) restrict trade in compute inputs. If compute restrictions can be made credibly multilateral across the US-Netherlands-Taiwan supply chain, they perform the same PD-transformation function as Montreal's trade sanctions—making non-participation in AI governance economically costly rather than individually rational. This contrasts sharply with voluntary AI safety commitments (Bletchley Declaration, Seoul AI Safety Summit) which maintain PD structure where defection remains dominant strategy. Barrett's framework predicts these voluntary instruments will fail to produce durable cooperation, while multilateral compute controls could succeed. The critical condition is credible multilateralism: unilateral export controls create arbitrage opportunities, but coordinated restrictions across chokepoint suppliers transform the game structure.