- Source: inbox/archive/2024-06-08-futardio-proposal-reward-the-university-of-waterloo-blockchain-club-with-1-mil.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 4) Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
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| type | entity_type | name | domain | status | parent_entity | platform | proposer | proposal_url | proposal_date | resolution_date | category | summary | tracked_by | created |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| entity | decision_market | IslandDAO: Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens | internet-finance | passed | deans-list | futardio | HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz | https://www.futard.io/proposal/7KkoRGyvzhvzKjxuPHjyxg77a52MeP6axyx7aywpGbdc | 2024-06-08 | 2024-06-11 | grants | Allocate 1M $DEAN tokens to University of Waterloo Blockchain Club to attract talent and increase governance participation | rio | 2026-03-11 |
IslandDAO: Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens
Summary
Proposal to allocate 1 million $DEAN tokens (equivalent to 1,300 USDC at time of proposal) to the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club's 200 members. The proposal required a 5% increase in The Dean's List DAO's fully diluted valuation (from $115,655 to $121,438) measured over a 5-day trading period to pass.
Market Data
- Outcome: Passed
- Proposer: HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
- Trading Period: 5 days (2024-06-08 to 2024-06-11)
- Token Allocation: 1,000,000 $DEAN (~1,300 USDC)
- Required FDV Increase: 5% ($5,783)
- Target FDV: $121,438
Significance
This proposal demonstrates futarchy-governed grant allocation with explicit ROI metrics. The proposal framework calculated that each of the 200 students needed to contribute activities increasing FDV by approximately $28.92 to justify the allocation, projecting a benefit of $4.45 per dollar spent. The tokens were to be held in a multi-signature wallet for secure management.
The proposal represents an early experiment in using conditional markets to evaluate community partnership investments, with measurable success criteria (5% FDV increase) rather than subjective governance voting.