teleo-codex/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-compensation-proph3t-nallok.md
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type entity_type name domain status tracked_by created last_updated parent_entity platform proposer proposal_url proposal_date resolution_date category summary tags
decision decision_market MetaDAO: Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok internet-finance passed rio 2026-03-11 2026-03-11 metadao futardio Proph3t & Nallok https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/BgHv9GutbnsXZLZQHqPL8BbGWwtcaRDWx82aeRMNmJbG 2024-05-27 2024-05-31 hiring Convex payout: 2% supply per $1B market cap increase (max 10% at $5B), $90K/yr salary each, 4-year vest starting April 2028
futarchy
compensation
founder-incentives
mechanism-design

MetaDAO: Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok

Summary

The founders proposed a convex performance-based compensation package: 2% of token supply per $1 billion market cap increase, capped at 10% (1,975 META each) at $5B. Fixed salary of $90K/year each. Four-year cliff — no tokens unlock before April 2028 regardless of milestones. DAO can claw back all tokens until December 2024. The $1B market cap benchmark was defined as $42,198 per META (allowing for 20% dilution post-proposal).

The proposal included explicit utility calculations using expected value theory: Nallok requires $361M success payout to rationally stay (20% success probability estimate), Proph3t requires $562M (10% success probability). This drove the 10% allocation at $5B market cap (~$500M payout each).

Market Data

  • Outcome: Passed (2024-05-31)
  • Autocrat version: 0.3
  • Key participants: Proph3t (architect/mechanism designer), Nallok (operations manager)

Significance

This is the first real-world example of futarchy-governed founder compensation. The mechanism design is sophisticated: convex payouts align incentives with exponential growth, the 4-year cliff signals long-term commitment, and the clawback provision creates accountability.

The explicit utility calculation in the proposal is remarkable — founders openly modeled their reservation wages, success probabilities, and effort costs, then derived the compensation that makes maximum effort rational. Proph3t estimated only 10% success probability, making his required payout higher than Nallok's despite both receiving equal allocation. This transparency is the opposite of typical startup compensation negotiations.

The proposal also honestly acknowledges centralization: "If Nallok and I walk away, probability of success drops by at least 50%." Futarchy governed the compensation decision, but the organization remained founder-dependent — the market approved this rather than pretending otherwise.

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