| claim |
grand-strategy |
The Paris Summit's framing shift from 'AI Safety' to 'AI Action' and China's signature alongside US/UK refusal reveals that the US now perceives international AI governance as a competitive constraint rather than a tool to limit adversaries |
experimental |
Paris AI Action Summit outcomes, EPC framing analysis ('Au Revoir, global AI Safety') |
2026-04-03 |
AI governance discourse has been captured by economic competitiveness framing, inverting predicted participation patterns where China signs non-binding declarations while the US opts out |
leo |
causal |
EPC, Elysée, Future Society |
| definitional-ambiguity-in-autonomous-weapons-governance-is-strategic-interest-not-bureaucratic-failure-because-major-powers-preserve-programs-through-vague-thresholds.md |
|
| International AI governance stepping-stone theory (voluntary → non-binding → binding) fails because strategic actors with frontier AI capabilities opt out even at the non-binding declaration stage |
| ai-governance-discourse-capture-by-competitiveness-framing-inverts-china-us-participation-patterns |
| international-ai-governance-stepping-stone-theory-fails-because-strategic-actors-opt-out-at-non-binding-stage |
|
| International AI governance stepping-stone theory (voluntary → non-binding → binding) fails because strategic actors with frontier AI capabilities opt out even at the non-binding declaration stage|related|2026-04-18 |
|
| Mutually Assured Deregulation makes voluntary AI governance structurally untenable because each actor's restraint creates competitive disadvantage, converting the governance game from cooperation to prisoner's dilemma |
|