51 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
51 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
---
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type: entity
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entity_type: decision_market
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name: "MetaDAO: Approve Fundraise #2"
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domain: internet-finance
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status: passed
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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last_updated: 2026-03-11
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parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
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platform: "futardio"
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proposer: "Proph3t"
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proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/9BMRY1HBe61MJoKEd9AAW5iNQyws2vGK6vuL49oR3AzX"
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proposal_date: 2024-06-26
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resolution_date: 2024-06-30
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category: fundraise
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summary: "Raise $1.5M by selling up to 4,000 META to VCs and angels at minimum $375/META ($7.81M FDV), no discount, no lockup"
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tags: ["futarchy", "fundraise", "capital-formation", "venture-capital"]
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---
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# MetaDAO: Approve Fundraise #2
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## Summary
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Proposal to raise $1.5M by selling up to 4,000 META to VCs and angels. Terms: no discount, no lockup, minimum price $375/META (implying $7.81M minimum FDV based on 20,823.5 META in public hands). Funds custodied by Proph3t and Nallok in a multisig, released at $100K/month to minimize DAO attack risk. Burn rate: $1.38M/year covering two founders ($90K each), three engineers ($190K each), audits ($300K), office ($80K), growth person ($150K), and admin ($100K).
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## Market Data
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- **Outcome:** Passed (2024-06-30)
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- **Autocrat version:** 0.3
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- **Key participants:** Proph3t (proposer), Nallok (multisig co-custodian)
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## Significance
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This was MetaDAO's first VC fundraise approved through futarchy — the market decided whether to dilute existing holders for growth capital. The "no discount, no lockup" terms are unusual for crypto fundraises and reflect futarchy's transparency ethos: investors get the same terms as the market.
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The multisig custodianship ($100K/month release) reveals a practical tension: futarchy governs the fundraise decision, but operational security requires trusted custodians. The DAO cannot safely hold and disburse large sums through governance alone — an early signal of the pattern where futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate scaffolding for treasury operations.
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The detailed budget breakdown provides one of the few public windows into early MetaDAO operational costs, valuable for benchmarking futarchy-governed organizations.
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[metadao]] — capital formation event
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- [[internet-capital-markets-compress-fundraising-timelines]] — futarchy-governed fundraise completed in 4 days
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- [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]] — multisig custody alongside futarchy approval
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- [[futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control]] — but this raise has identifiable custodians, complicating the "no beneficial owners" argument
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---
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Relevant Entities:
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- [[metadao]] — parent organization
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- [[proph3t]] — proposer and custodian
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Topics:
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- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
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