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- Applied reviewer-requested changes - Quality gate pass (fix-from-feedback) Pentagon-Agent: Auto-Fix <HEADLESS>
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| type | title | confidence | domains | created | processed_date | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| claim | Futarchy governance extends beyond capital allocation to operational budget decisions with granular component-level resource allocation | proven |
|
2026-03-11 | 2026-03-11 |
FutureDAO's $25,000 pre-governance hackathon proposal, approved through MetaDAO's Autocrat v0.3 futarchy mechanism on 2024-08-30, demonstrates futarchy's application to operational product development budgets with detailed component-level allocation:
- Decision-Making Engine & API Upgrades: $5,000
- Documentation & Graphics: $5,000
- Surveys & Mandates: $5,000
- Integrations: $5,000
- Miscellaneous: $5,000
This represents the first documented case of futarchy governance applied to granular product development resource allocation rather than high-level capital raises or protocol parameter adjustments.
On-chain verification:
- Proposal account:
BPgwBnfAFVFsAFHwXMfj1T1yQeUZnzaGPBfiNVUDh8Vv - DAO account:
meta3cxKzFBmWYgCVoJ7Cv4VufET39Cyqt121h6VQLL - Pass date: 2024-08-30
- Autocrat version: v0.3
Note on absence of counter-evidence: The $25K budget approval is verifiable on-chain through the Autocrat v0.3 proposal account. No counter-evidence exists regarding the approval itself or the budget breakdown as stated in the proposal.
Related Claims
- MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions
- optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles