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- Source: inbox/archive/2024-02-20-futardio-proposal-develop-multi-option-proposals.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 2) Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
41 lines
3.9 KiB
Markdown
41 lines
3.9 KiB
Markdown
---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "Multi-modal proposals allow DAOs to evaluate N alternatives simultaneously through parallel conditional markets rather than sequential binary votes"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "agrippa (futard.io proposal J7dWFgSSuMg3BNZBAKYp3AD5D2yuaaLUmyKqvxBZgHht), 2024-02-20"
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created: 2024-02-20
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---
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# Multi-modal futarchy proposals enable simultaneous evaluation of mutually-exclusive alternatives without sequential voting
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Futarchy as originally implemented supports only binary outcomes (pass/fail). Multi-modal proposals extend this to N mutually-exclusive outcomes, where one outcome is "fail" and the rest are distinct alternatives. This architectural change transforms the decision space from sequential binary choices to parallel multi-option evaluation.
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To choose among 5 alternatives using binary proposals requires 4-5 sequential votes (depending on tournament structure). With multi-modal proposals, all 5 alternatives are evaluated simultaneously through parallel conditional markets. Each alternative gets its own conditional token market, and the market prices reveal relative preference across all options at once.
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Agrippa's proposal cites the use case of "choose the first place prize of the Solana Scribes contest, where there's a conditional market on each applicant." Without multi-modal proposals, a futarchic DAO has "basically no mechanism" for making such choices. Multi-modal proposals solve this by creating a conditional market on each candidate, letting the market aggregate information about which choice maximizes the objective function.
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**Architectural scalability:** Agrippa argues "there is no need to hard-limit the number of conditions in a conditional vault / number of outcomes in a proposal." The mechanism scales to arbitrary N without introducing new security or mechanism design considerations, because "conditional markets do not compete with each other over liquidity" — each market prices its own outcome independently.
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## Evidence
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- Agrippa's MetaDAO proposal (2024-02-20) proposes funding multi-modal proposal development, arguing the feature provides "a huge amount of value" by enabling choice among multiple alternatives
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- Specific use case cited: Solana Scribes contest with N applicants, each getting a conditional market
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- Architectural claim: no hard limit needed on number of outcomes; scales to arbitrary N
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- Security claim: multi-modal proposals "do not particularly introduce any new security / mechanism design considerations"
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- Proposer estimates +5% DAO value from "ability to weigh multiple exclusive alternatives at once" via exponential decision-making bandwidth increase
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## Limitations
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This is a single-source proposal from the developer seeking funding to build the feature. No implementation exists yet. The claim that this provides "exponential" bandwidth increase is the proposer's framing; the actual improvement is linear in the number of alternatives (N options evaluated in 1 vote vs N sequential votes), though time savings compound when multiple such decisions are needed.
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The liquidity independence claim ("conditional markets do not compete with each other over liquidity") may be overstated — while markets don't directly compete, total capital available for futarchy is finite, and fragmenting it across N markets could reduce depth in each, exacerbating existing liquidity constraints.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md]]
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md]]
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- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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