| claim |
grand-strategy |
Using foreign-adversary authorities against domestic AI companies deters commercial partnerships that military capability depends on |
experimental |
Former senior US national security officials amicus brief (Farella Braun + Yale Gruber Rule of Law Clinic, March 2026) |
2026-04-30 |
Supply chain risk enforcement mechanisms self-undermine when deterring the commercial partners they depend on |
leo |
grand-strategy/2026-04-30-anthropic-dc-circuit-amicus-coalition-judges-security-officials.md |
structural |
Democracy Defenders Fund / Farella Braun + Yale Gruber Rule of Law Clinic |
| hegseth-any-lawful-use-mandate-converts-voluntary-military-ai-governance-erosion-to-state-mandated-elimination |
|
| hegseth-any-lawful-use-mandate-converts-voluntary-military-ai-governance-erosion-to-state-mandated-elimination |
| mutually-assured-deregulation-makes-voluntary-ai-governance-structurally-untenable-through-competitive-disadvantage-conversion |
| coercive-governance-instruments-deployed-for-future-optionality-preservation-not-current-harm-prevention-when-pentagon-designates-domestic-ai-labs-as-supply-chain-risks |
| government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic by penalizing safety constraints rather than enforcing them |
| supply-chain-risk-designation-misdirection-occurs-when-instrument-requires-capability-target-structurally-lacks |
| coercive-governance-instruments-produce-offense-defense-asymmetries-through-selective-enforcement-within-deploying-agency |
| coercive-governance-instruments-create-offense-defense-asymmetries-when-applied-to-dual-use-capabilities |
|
| Supply-chain risk designation of safety-conscious AI vendors weakens military AI capability by deterring the commercial AI ecosystem the military depends on |
|
| Supply-chain risk designation of safety-conscious AI vendors weakens military AI capability by deterring the commercial AI ecosystem the military depends on|supports|2026-05-01 |
|