teleo-codex/domains/internet-finance/token-migration-success-threshold-at-60-percent-presale-creates-credible-reversion-mechanism.md

type	domain	description	confidence	source	created
claim	internet-finance	FutureDAO's 60% presale completion threshold creates automatic failure handling that returns capital and burns new tokens without governance intervention	experimental	FutureDAO token migrator proposal, 2024-06-05	2024-06-05

Token migration success threshold at 60 percent presale creates credible reversion mechanism

FutureDAO's token migrator uses a 60% presale completion threshold to determine whether a migration executes or reverts. This binary success criterion creates a credible commitment mechanism: if the community cannot raise 60% of the presale target, the protocol automatically returns all presale SOL to participants, allows new tokens to be swapped back to old tokens, and burns all new tokens.

This threshold serves multiple functions:

1. Coordination signal — 60% participation demonstrates sufficient community support
2. Sybil resistance — Requires real capital commitment, not just voting
3. Automatic failure handling — No manual intervention or governance decision needed for failed migrations
4. Credible exit — Participants know they get full refunds if threshold not met

The mechanism parallels futarchy-governed liquidation but applies to community-led migrations rather than team-led launches.

Evidence

Success path (>60% presale raised):

• Old token sold to reclaim locked LP
• New token + raised SOL placed in LP
• New tokens claimable by swap and presale participants
• Unclaimed new tokens sent to community multisig (explicitly not FutureDAO's multisig)
• Old token holders who don't migrate receive 50% airdrop

Failure path (<60% presale raised):

• Presale SOL returned to all participants
• New tokens must be swapped back to old tokens frozen in contract
• All new tokens burned

Threshold design: The proposal does not explain why 60% was chosen over other thresholds (50%, 67%, 75%). This appears to be an arbitrary design choice rather than derived from empirical data about community coordination or historical migration success rates.

Challenges

The 60% threshold may be:

• Too high for fragmented communities where coordination is difficult even with genuine support, leading to failed migrations despite aggregate support exceeding 60%
• Too low to ensure the migration represents true community consensus rather than a vocal minority
• Gameable if large holders can push migrations over the threshold despite broader community opposition

The mechanism also creates a coordination problem: rational participants may wait to see if others commit first, leading to migrations failing even when aggregate support exceeds 60%. The proposal does not address this free-rider problem.

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Relevant Notes:

• Parallel mechanism to futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md applied to community takeovers
• Related to optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md

Topics:

• domains/internet-finance/_map
• core/mechanisms/_map