m3taversal
a74dec9176
- What: New proven-confidence claim documenting MetaDAO's perfect OTC pricing record — 5 below-market deals rejected, 4 at-or-above-market deals accepted. Updated decision markets map with correct count (was 7, now 9) and all 9 proposal links. - Why: m3ta flagged the 10/10 decision record for extraction. 9 of 10 are now documented with full on-chain sources. The Radium OTC (10th) needs source material — flagged in claim body as pending. - Connections: Strengthens anti-extraction thesis. Cross-references oversubscription rewrite (what oversubscription doesn't prove vs what OTC record does prove). Pentagon-Agent: Rio <244BA05F-3AA3-4079-8C59-6D68A77C76FE>
8.9 KiB
MetaDAO Decision Markets
Complete index of all futarchy governance decisions in MetaDAO's history. 37 recorded proposals spanning November 2023 through March 2026. Each decision was resolved through conditional token markets (Autocrat) where the market price determines the outcome.
What These Markets Reveal
Seven decisions that define MetaDAO's evolution and demonstrate what futarchy actually does in practice:
1. The market rejects bad proposals, even good ideas
The Futardio concept was proposed three times. First as a "memecoin launchpad" (August 2024) — rejected on reputational risk grounds. Then as a one-sentence "should MetaDAO create Futardio?" (November 2024) — rejected for zero specification. Finally as a detailed "Release a Launchpad" proposal with full mechanism design (February 2025) — passed. The market distinguished between a good idea and a good proposal. Same concept, three different proposals, market approved only the one with real substance.
- metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad → Failed
- metadao-create-futardio → Failed
- metadao-release-launchpad → Passed
2. Futarchy prevents value extraction — perfect OTC pricing record (9/9)
Across 9 OTC proposals spanning February 2024 to March 2026, the market rejected every below-market deal and accepted every at-or-above-market deal. The mechanism is price-sensitive, not relationship-sensitive: Theia was rejected at a 12.7% discount and accepted at a 14% premium. Pantera Capital was rejected at a capped-upside deal near spot. DBA/Variant's $6M at 30% discount was rejected, META surged 16%. META-033 (sell at market or premium) passed as the replacement fundraise. See MetaDAO futarchy has a perfect OTC pricing record rejecting every below-market deal and accepting every at-or-above-market deal across 9 documented proposals for the full analysis.
- metadao-otc-trade-ben-hawkins → Failed (66% discount)
- metadao-otc-trade-ben-hawkins-2 → Failed (below market)
- metadao-otc-trade-pantera-capital → Failed (capped upside)
- metadao-otc-trade-theia-1 → Failed (12.7% discount)
- metadao-vc-discount-rejection → Rejected (30% discount, +16% surge)
- metadao-otc-trade-colosseum → Passed (at market, TWAP-based)
- metadao-otc-trade-theia-2 → Passed (14% premium)
- metadao-otc-trade-theia-3 → Passed (38% premium)
- metadao-sell-2m-meta-at-market-or-premium → Passed (market-or-premium floor)
3. Community can override founders on radical changes
The 99.3% META burn (March 2024) was proposed by community members doctor.sol and rar3, not by founders. It eliminated nearly the entire treasury-held META supply, fundamentally changing tokenomics. This is a concrete example of futarchy enabling non-founder governance proposals with material treasury impact.
- metadao-burn-993-percent-meta → Passed
4. Futarchy can choose temporary centralization when needed
The BDF3M appointment (March 2024) made Proph3t and Nallok "Benevolent Dictators for 3 Months" to resolve an execution bottleneck. The market voted for centralization — with an expiration date. The term expired on schedule, FaaS launched, and the bottleneck resolved. Futarchy didn't resist centralization ideologically; it governed the terms of centralization.
5. Failed proposals succeed later when better specified
The token split + elastic supply proposal failed in January 2025. A nearly identical proposal passed 6 months later (August 2025) as the META token migration (1:1000 split, mintable supply, new DAO v0.5). The difference: context had shifted, the DAO had exhausted its META treasury via the Theia OTC, and mintable tokens were now a necessity rather than a preference.
- metadao-token-split-elastic-supply → Failed
- metadao-migrate-meta-token → Passed
6. The enforcement mechanism works
Ranger Finance liquidation (March 2026) — 97% market support, $5.04M USDC returned to holders after documented material misrepresentation. This was the second successful liquidation after mtnCapital (~September 2025). Two cases establish a pattern: the unruggable ICO enforcement mechanism is not theoretical. When teams misrepresent, the market votes to liquidate and capital returns.
- metadao-ranger-finance-liquidation → Passed
7. Futarchy funds its own research
Robin Hanson — the economist who invented futarchy in 2000 — was hired as advisor (February 2025), and a $80K GMU research proposal to experimentally test futarchy with 500 participants was filed (March 2026). The mechanism is investing in understanding itself.
- metadao-hire-robin-hanson → Passed
- metadao-fund-futarchy-research-hanson-gmu → Active
Full Decision Index
2023 (3 proposals — all passed)
| Date | Proposal | Category | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023-11-18 | metadao-develop-lst-vote-market | Strategy | Passed |
| 2023-12-03 | metadao-migrate-autocrat-v01 | Mechanism | Passed |
| 2023-12-16 | metadao-develop-saber-vote-market | Mechanism | Passed |
2024 (21 proposals — 14 passed, 7 failed)
2025 (7 proposals — 5 passed, 2 failed)
| Date | Proposal | Category | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-01-03 | metadao-otc-trade-theia-1 | Treasury | Failed |
| 2025-01-27 | metadao-otc-trade-theia-2 | Fundraise | Passed |
| 2025-01-28 | metadao-token-split-elastic-supply | Mechanism | Failed |
| 2025-02-10 | metadao-hire-robin-hanson | Hiring | Passed |
| 2025-02-26 | metadao-release-launchpad | Strategy | Passed |
| 2025-07-21 | metadao-otc-trade-theia-3 | Treasury | Passed |
| 2025-08-07 | metadao-migrate-meta-token | Mechanism | Passed |
2026 (6 proposals — 2 passed, 1 rejected, 1 active, 2 pending)
| Date | Proposal | Category | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-02 | metadao-vc-discount-rejection | Treasury | Rejected |
| 2026-03 | metadao-ranger-finance-liquidation | Enforcement | Passed |
| 2026-03 | metadao-omnibus-migration-proposal | Mechanism | Passed |
| 2026-03-21 | metadao-fund-futarchy-research-hanson-gmu | Operations | Active |
| 2026-03-22 | metadao-governance-migration-2026-03 | Mechanism | Active |
| 2026-03 | metadao-meta036-hanson-futarchy-research | Operations | — |
Summary Statistics
- Total proposals: 37
- Passed: 24 (65%)
- Failed/Rejected: 11 (30%)
- Active/Pending: 3 (8%)
- Categories: Treasury (11), Mechanism (8), Strategy (6), Fundraise (4), Hiring (3), Operations (3), Governance (1), Enforcement (1)
- OTC trade proposals: 9 total — 4 passed (all at or above market), 5 failed/rejected (all below market). Perfect pricing classification. See MetaDAO futarchy has a perfect OTC pricing record rejecting every below-market deal and accepting every at-or-above-market deal across 9 documented proposals.
- Time span: November 2023 — March 2026 (~29 months)
The OTC pattern alone is the strongest empirical evidence for futarchy's anti-extraction properties: every below-market deal rejected, every at-or-above-market deal accepted. 9/9 across 29 months, multiple counterparties, deal sizes from $50K to $6M.
Topics:
Relevant Entities:
- metadao — parent entity