3.1 KiB
| type | entity_type | name | domain | status | tracked_by | created | last_updated | parent_entity | platform | proposer | proposal_url | proposal_date | resolution_date | category | summary | tags | ||||
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| entity | decision_market | MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2 | internet-finance | passed | rio | 2026-03-11 | 2026-03-11 | metadao | futardio | HenryE & Proph3t | https://www.futard.io/proposal/HXohDRKtDcXNKnWysjyjK8S5SvBe76J5o4NdcF4jj963 | 2024-03-28 | 2024-04-03 | mechanism | Upgrade Autocrat to v0.2 with reclaimable rent, conditional token merging, improved metadata, and lower pass threshold (5% to 3%) |
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MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2
Summary
Technical upgrade from Autocrat v0.1 to v0.2. Three new features: (1) reclaimable rent — recover ~4 SOL used to create proposal markets, lowering proposal creation friction; (2) conditional token merging — combine 1 pTOKEN + 1 fTOKEN back into 1 TOKEN, improving liquidity during multiple active proposals; (3) conditional token metadata — tokens show names and logos in wallets instead of raw mint addresses. Config changes: pass threshold lowered from 5% to 3%, default TWAP value set to $100, TWAP updates in $5 increments (enhancing manipulation resistance), minimum META lot size reduced from 1 to 0.1 META.
Market Data
- Outcome: Passed (2024-04-03)
- Autocrat version: 0.1 (last proposal on v0.1)
- Key participants: HenryE (author), Proph3t (author), OtterSec (program verification)
Significance
First major Autocrat upgrade approved through futarchy itself — MetaDAO used its own governance mechanism to upgrade its governance mechanism. The changes directly addressed friction points: high proposal creation costs (~4 SOL), liquidity fragmentation across proposals, and poor UX for conditional tokens.
The pass threshold reduction from 5% to 3% is particularly noteworthy — it lowered the bar for proposals to pass, reflecting the team's belief that the original threshold was too conservative. The TWAP manipulation resistance improvements ($5 increments instead of 1%) show iterative mechanism refinement based on live experience.
Programs deployed: autocrat_v0 (metaRK9dUBnrAdZN6uUDKvxBVKW5pyCbPVmLtUZwtBp), openbook_twap (twAP5sArq2vDS1mZCT7f4qRLwzTfHvf5Ay5R5Q5df1m), conditional_vault (vAuLTQjV5AZx5f3UgE75wcnkxnQowWxThn1hGjfCVwP).
Relationship to KB
- metadao — mechanism upgrade
- MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window — Autocrat evolution
- futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject — iterative UX improvements
- futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements — directly addressed proposal creation friction
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