teleo-infrastructure/docs/gcp-infra-hardening-20260707.md
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Add GitHub WIF GCP readiness probe (#45)
2026-07-07 12:41:09 +02:00

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GCP CI/CD and Redundancy Hardening

This records the current GCP hardening contract for teleo-501523.

What Is Live

  • Artifact Registry Docker repositories exist in europe-west6:
    • teleo
    • livingip-web
  • Both repositories use immutable tags and active vulnerability scanning.
  • cloudbuild.gcp-staging.yaml builds the staging Teleo image, runs the image smoke test, then pushes to Artifact Registry.
  • Cloud Build runs as the dedicated service account:
    • sa-teleo-cloudbuild@teleo-501523.iam.gserviceaccount.com
  • The dedicated Cloud Build account has only the roles required for the current build/publish path:
    • roles/artifactregistry.writer
    • roles/logging.logWriter
    • roles/storage.objectViewer
  • GitHub Actions can publish Artifact Registry images through Workload Identity Federation:
    • workflow: .github/workflows/gcp-artifact.yml
    • provider: projects/785938879453/locations/global/workloadIdentityPools/github-actions/providers/living-ip-github
    • service account: sa-artifact-builder@teleo-501523.iam.gserviceaccount.com
    • repository scope: living-ip/teleo-infrastructure
  • Backup buckets are versioned and use uniform bucket-level access:
    • gs://teleo-501523-prod-backups
    • gs://teleo-501523-leoclean-backups
  • VM boot disks have a daily 7-day snapshot policy:
    • teleo-prod-1
    • teleo-staging-1
  • Cloud SQL standby target exists for KB restore/replication drills:
    • instance: teleo-pgvector-standby
    • database: teleo_kb
    • version: POSTGRES_16
    • private IP only on teleo-staging-net
    • encrypted-only SQL connections
    • automated backups and point-in-time recovery enabled
    • deletion protection enabled
  • Source-side Teleo DB/KB export canary exists:
    • script: ops/backup_vps_sqlite_kb.sh
    • source DB: /opt/teleo-eval/pipeline/pipeline.db
    • source Leo/KB files: workspaces/*/agents/leo plus agent-state
    • excludes secrets and logs
  • Local SQLite-to-Postgres restore canary exists:
    • scripts: ops/sqlite_to_postgres_dump.py and ops/run_sqlite_postgres_restore_canary.sh
    • target: disposable local postgres:16-alpine shadow schema
    • verifies source SQLite integrity and per-table source/target row-count parity

How To Build

Automatic Artifact Registry publishing runs on pushes to main through GitHub Actions. To run the same lane manually from GitHub:

gh workflow run gcp-artifact.yml --repo living-ip/teleo-infrastructure --ref main

The workflow authenticates to GCP with Workload Identity Federation, builds Dockerfile.gcp-staging, runs the image smoke test, pushes the image, and uploads gcp-artifact-image.txt as a run artifact.

For a read-only GCP posture probe through the same Workload Identity path:

gh workflow run gcp-readiness.yml --repo living-ip/teleo-infrastructure --ref main

This workflow runs ops/check_gcp_infra_readiness.py from GitHub Actions and uploads stdout, stderr, exit code, and a summary as the gcp-readiness artifact. It is intentionally non-mutating. If the Artifact Registry service account lacks broader read permissions, the artifact is still the proof of the exact IAM gap.

For a local/manual Cloud Build proof:

REVISION="$(git rev-parse HEAD)"
TAG="$(git rev-parse --short=7 HEAD)-manual-$(date -u +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)"

gcloud builds submit \
  --project=teleo-501523 \
  --config=cloudbuild.gcp-staging.yaml \
  --substitutions="_TAG=${TAG},_REVISION=${REVISION}"

Expected result:

  • build-staging-image succeeds.
  • smoke-test-image-before-push succeeds.
  • A Docker image is pushed to: europe-west6-docker.pkg.dev/teleo-501523/teleo/teleo-pipeline-gcp-staging:${TAG}

How To Check Readiness

Run from the repository root:

python3 ops/check_gcp_infra_readiness.py

The check is read-only and prints no secret values. It verifies:

  • Artifact Registry immutability and vulnerability scanning.
  • Cloud Build config contract.
  • Dedicated Cloud Build service account and roles.
  • GitHub Actions WIF Artifact Registry publishing contract.
  • Network ingress posture:
    • no enabled broad SSH/RDP ingress;
    • Teleo SSH rules are scoped to /32 source ranges and target tags.
  • Runtime service-account posture for the prod/staging VMs.
  • Compute disk snapshot policy attachment.
  • Backup bucket versioning and uniform access.
  • Cloud SQL standby target posture.
  • Source SQLite/KB backup/export repeatability.
  • Whether an approved source KB/Postgres dump or replication credential exists.
  • Whether source data has actually been restored or replicated into GCP and queried.
  • Whether the GitHub WIF readiness workflow exists for non-local readback.

Current Boundaries

The GCP Docker build/publish path is live through manual Cloud Build and GitHub Actions Workload Identity Federation. Native Cloud Build GitHub triggers are not configured because this project currently has no Cloud Build repository connection.

Database redundancy is not complete. The current project now has a GCP Cloud SQL/Postgres standby target, backup buckets, VM disk snapshots, and a repeatable source SQLite/KB export script. It does not yet have source-data restore or replication into GCP. Do not claim DB parity until one of these is true:

  • the existing canonical KB database is replicated into GCP and read back; or
  • GCP Cloud SQL/Postgres becomes the canonical database and production services read/write it; or
  • an explicitly approved standby restore drill proves that a GCP database can be restored and queried from the retained backups.

Do not call the empty teleo-pgvector-standby instance redundancy by itself. It only counts after source data, restore/replication, access controls, and query readback are proven.

The local restore canary narrows the remaining gap: the source SQLite backup can be converted and restored into PostgreSQL with table/row-count parity, but the same import still needs to run against the GCP Cloud SQL standby through an approved GCP auth and network path.

Communication Posture

Current GCP communication hardening is limited to the surfaces already read back:

  • default SSH/RDP firewall rules are disabled;
  • Teleo SSH access is scoped by instance tags and current source IP rules;
  • the custom Teleo subnet has Private Google Access enabled.
  • prod/staging VMs run as dedicated Teleo service accounts, not the default Compute Engine service account.

Before production cutover, add a dedicated runtime communication contract for service-to-service paths, including exact source tags/service accounts, allowed ports, health checks, and rollback.