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teleo-infrastructure/docs/gcp-leoclean-runtime-reconciliation.md

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GCP Leo Runtime Reconciliation

Scope

This runbook reconciles PR #145 with the non-production GCP parallel Leo service and removes its dependency on the PostgreSQL administrator credential. It does not promote GCP, change the Telegram destination, copy newer VPS data, or make teleo_canonical production-authoritative.

Target surfaces:

  • project: teleo-501523;
  • VM: teleo-prod-1 in europe-west6-a;
  • service: leoclean-gcp-prod-parallel.service;
  • Cloud SQL database: teleo_canonical on private address 10.61.0.3;
  • runtime database role: leoclean_kb_runtime;
  • staging-function owner: leoclean_kb_stage_owner (NOLOGIN);
  • runtime secret: gcp-teleo-pgvector-standby-leoclean-kb-runtime-password.

Observed before reconciliation on 2026-07-14: the service was active/running, but /usr/local/bin/teleo-kb matched unmerged PR #145, the effective systemd environment selected database user postgres and the administrator password secret, and a live teleo-kb status call exceeded a 20-second bound. Secret Manager access and private PostgreSQL reachability both passed independently, isolating the timeout to the old helper path rather than IAM or networking.

Required End State

  1. The live wrapper and Cloud SQL helper hashes match a merged repository commit.
  2. TELEO_KB_MODE=cloudsql; missing tools or credentials fail closed.
  3. Canonical zero-hit searches do not consult teleo_restore unless an operator explicitly opts in.
  4. Leo can read the named canonical tables and stage only a pending_review proposal through kb_stage.stage_leoclean_proposal(...).
  5. Leo cannot directly insert, update, or delete public.* or kb_stage.kb_proposals, forge the proposer identity, SET ROLE into a broader principal, or execute reviewer/apply functions.
  6. The VM runtime identity can access only the scoped password secret needed by this path, not the PostgreSQL administrator password secret.
  7. Deployment proves the attached VM service account from the metadata server, uses an empty phase-local Cloud SDK configuration, and rolls the complete prior runtime set back if installation or post-restart verification fails.

Safe Order Of Operations

1. Read-only access and IAM audit

Confirm the operator can read the project, use IAP/OS Login for the VM, inspect Cloud SQL metadata, and inspect Secret Manager IAM. Identify the VM service account and determine whether its secret access is project-wide or secret-specific. Do not remove a project-wide binding until every legitimately required runtime secret has an equivalent secret-level binding.

2. Merge reviewed repository code

Run CI on the completed PR #145 repair before deployment. The deployment source must be the resulting merged commit, not a working tree or unmerged branch.

3. Create the scoped secret and grant only the VM runtime identity

Create the scoped secret without printing its value. Add one randomly generated version, then grant roles/secretmanager.secretAccessor on that secret to the VM runtime service account. Do not put PGPASSWORD in systemd, a repository, an artifact, or a command transcript.

4. Provision the scoped PostgreSQL role once

Run ops/gcp_leoclean_runtime_role.sql as the Cloud SQL administrator from the private VM path. Supply the new runtime password through TELEO_LEOCLEAN_DB_PASSWORD; the SQL file does not contain it. The migration:

  • creates or rotates leoclean_kb_runtime;
  • creates a dedicated NOLOGIN function owner with no role memberships;
  • removes stale table, column, sequence, function, and role-membership grants;
  • grants exact canonical reads;
  • creates a locked security-definer staging function that hard-codes both pending_review and canonical proposer leo;
  • grants no direct table writes;
  • removes all access to the legacy teleo_restore schema;
  • aborts if either scoped role owns or can reach anything outside the explicit allowlist.

PostgreSQL grants TEMP to PUBLIC by default. The migration removes any direct scoped TEMP grant and reports the remaining effective privilege, but does not revoke TEMP from PUBLIC: PostgreSQL has no per-role deny, so that would be a database-wide behavior change requiring a separate inventory of kb_apply, reviewer, and operator use. The staging function remains protected by a pg_catalog, pg_temp search path, schema-qualified relations, a fixed session_user, and a tested temporary-object shadowing denial.

The administrator password is used only for this bounded bootstrap. Retain no password output.

5. Preflight and deploy the merged runtime

From the exact merged checkout, run:

deploy/sync-gcp-leoclean-runtime.sh --dry-run
deploy/sync-gcp-leoclean-runtime.sh --restart

The deploy script runs a scoped, redacted database status preflight before it installs files or restarts the service. It refuses dirty or unmerged runtime files and refuses a live install without --restart. After preflight it stops the parallel service, atomically replaces the existing Cloud SQL systemd drop-in, installs the reviewed wrapper and helper, records the Git revision, starts the service, and verifies all three file hashes. A failure after mutation restores the prior wrapper, helper, drop-in, and revision as one set before the old service is restarted.

6. Verify positive and negative behavior

Retain a redacted receipt containing:

  • merged Git commit and deployed file hashes;
  • service ActiveState, SubState, MainPID, and NRestarts;
  • metadata-server identity and an access token obtained with an empty Cloud SDK configuration;
  • current_database() and current_user showing teleo_canonical|leoclean_kb_runtime;
  • a real canonical status/search receipt;
  • a transaction-rolled-back call to stage_leoclean_proposal(...) that returns pending_review;
  • denied direct insert into kb_stage.kb_proposals;
  • denied canonical public.* write;
  • denied reviewer/apply security-definer function;
  • denied forged proposer identity and denied SET ROLE escalation;
  • zero Telegram messages and zero committed canary rows.

7. Remove administrator-secret access

Only after the scoped service passes post-restart verification, remove the VM runtime identity's access path to gcp-teleo-pgvector-standby-postgres-password. Verify from the VM runtime identity that the scoped secret is readable and the administrator secret is denied. Never delete the administrator secret merely to enforce runtime least privilege; backup/restore operators may still require it under a separate identity.

Stop Conditions

Stop without cutover if any of these are true:

  • the deployed revision is not merged;
  • the scoped status preflight fails;
  • the role has direct proposal-table insert or canonical write permission;
  • any approval/apply function is executable by the runtime role;
  • removing broad Secret Manager access would break another required secret;
  • GCP canonical rows are still stale relative to the chosen authority.

The last condition does not invalidate this runtime security repair. It means GCP remains staging and data reconciliation stays a separate, explicitly authorized slice.