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teleo-infrastructure/docs/gcp-leoclean-nosend-service-package.md

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GCP leoclean no-send service package

Outcome

This slice packages the revision-bound Hermes/leoclean no-send artifact and one explicit identity bundle as an immutable OCI image for a separate leoclean-gcp-nosend.service on teleo-staging-1.

It is target-architecture staging work, not a production cutover. The image is the atomic compatibility boundary because Python, the locked Hermes virtual environment, PostgreSQL client, Cloud SQL CA, runtime artifact, identity files, and container entrypoint must move and roll back together.

Exact target and authority boundary

  • project: teleo-501523
  • zone: europe-west6-a
  • instance: teleo-staging-1
  • service account: sa-teleo-staging-vm@teleo-501523.iam.gserviceaccount.com
  • service: leoclean-gcp-nosend.service
  • platform: linux/amd64
  • image repository: europe-west6-docker.pkg.dev/teleo-501523/teleo/leoclean-nosend-staging

The package adds only a deployable, digest-addressed staging service surface. It does not add IAM, Secret Manager, database-role, proposal-approval, canonical-apply, transport, production, or VPS authority.

The service has no provider credential in this slice. It can prove the gateway and database-tool boundary, but paid model calls require a separately reviewed internal no-send ingress and credential-delivery design during the parity slice.

Immutable closure

The dedicated Dockerfile uses only digest-pinned base images:

  • Python 3.11.9;
  • uv 0.9.30;
  • PostgreSQL client 16.14 on Bookworm.

There is no apt-get, floating pip install, editable install, or image tag in the closure. The final image also binds:

  • the exact Teleo Git revision and release-pass artifact receipt;
  • Hermes commit and source-tree hash;
  • the artifact content and manifest hashes;
  • the exact uv lock;
  • the synthetic identity manifest, lock, SOUL.md, structured identity.json, original source hashes, and bundle hashes;
  • the exact no-send model, skills, tool registry, proposal-only database policy, and runtime-probe receipt that produced the identity runtime contract;
  • the Cloud SQL server CA hash;
  • the Dockerfile, entrypoint, and package-contract hashes.

The runtime image starts with a capability-limited bootstrap that creates a fresh tmpfs profile, then drops all groups, UID/GID to 65532, and all Linux capability bounding sets before executing Hermes. The gateway readiness receipt is written only after the real zero-adapter runner starts and its sealed tool registry is rechecked.

The PostgreSQL base image's inherited data-volume path is explicitly shadowed by a tiny read-only, non-executable, mode-0000 tmpfs. This prevents Docker from exposing an unused writable database directory to the runtime.

Prepare a build context

First compile and release-verify the no-send artifact from the exact clean revision, retaining it only after verification passes:

LEOCLEAN_NOSEND_ARTIFACT_OUTPUT=/tmp/leoclean-nosend-artifact \
  scripts/run_leoclean_nosend_runtime_canary.sh

Derive the identity runtime contract from that artifact and receipt, generate a synthetic/noncanonical manifest from the committed fixture sources, and compile the two generated views:

python3 ops/gcp_leoclean_nosend_package.py identity-contract \
  --artifact /tmp/leoclean-nosend-artifact \
  --receipt .crabbox-results/leoclean-nosend-runtime.json \
  --output /tmp/leoclean-nosend-identity-contract.json

python3 ops/gcp_leoclean_nosend_package.py generate-identity-manifest \
  --artifact /tmp/leoclean-nosend-artifact \
  --receipt .crabbox-results/leoclean-nosend-runtime.json \
  --database-fingerprint fixtures/working-leo/leo-identity-v1/leo-database-fingerprint-v1.json \
  --constitution fixtures/working-leo/leo-identity-v1/leo-constitution-v1.json \
  --database-identity fixtures/working-leo/leo-identity-v1/leo-database-identity-v1.json \
  --identity-source-root . \
  --output /tmp/leoclean-nosend-identity-manifest.json

python3 ops/gcp_leoclean_nosend_package.py compile-identity \
  --artifact /tmp/leoclean-nosend-artifact \
  --receipt .crabbox-results/leoclean-nosend-runtime.json \
  --identity-manifest /tmp/leoclean-nosend-identity-manifest.json \
  --identity-source-root . \
  --output /tmp/leoclean-nosend-identity

The compiled identity directory contains exactly:

  • SOUL.md
  • identity.json
  • identity-lock.json
  • identity-manifest.json

Then run:

python3 ops/gcp_leoclean_nosend_package.py prepare \
  --artifact /tmp/leoclean-nosend-artifact \
  --receipt .crabbox-results/leoclean-nosend-runtime.json \
  --identity /tmp/leoclean-nosend-identity \
  --identity-source-root . \
  --output /tmp/leoclean-nosend-image-context

The command fails closed on a development receipt, revision drift, content or mode drift, unsafe links, an inconsistent identity lock, source or generated view drift, a runtime/model/skills/permission mismatch, any canonical-authority claim, a changed CA, a non-staging target, or an existing output directory. The resulting context is secret-free. Direct canonical and staging-table writes remain denied; proposal staging remains available only through kb_stage.stage_leoclean_proposal(text,text,text,text,jsonb).

The Git gate is closure-specific: the Dockerfile, entrypoint, package contract, Cloud SQL CA, identity validators, and manifest-derived synthetic identity sources must be tracked regular files whose bytes, modes, staged state, and SHA-256 values match the exact HEAD commit. Unrelated user worktree changes remain permitted because they cannot enter this image context.

Use the exact values in build-args.json as Docker build arguments. The image build itself revalidates that those values equal image-input.json.

Finalize one inspected digest-bound release

After an authorized build and Artifact Registry push returns the immutable image digest:

python3 ops/gcp_leoclean_nosend_package.py finalize \
  --image-input /tmp/leoclean-nosend-image-context/image-input.json \
  --image-reference \
    europe-west6-docker.pkg.dev/teleo-501523/teleo/leoclean-nosend-staging@sha256:<64-hex-digest> \
  --expected-revision <reviewed-40-hex-git-revision> \
  --expected-input-sha256 <reviewed-image-input-sha256> \
  --expected-config-digest sha256:<reviewed-build-config-digest> \
  --docker-binary /usr/bin/docker \
  --docker-host unix:///var/run/docker.sock \
  --docker-config /home/operator/.docker \
  --output-bundle /tmp/leoclean-nosend-release

This command uses Docker to pull the exact Artifact Registry digest for linux/amd64, inspects the immutable local image, and refuses to create either bundle file unless the requested repository digest is present and the platform, config digest, complete required label set, runtime-bearing image configuration, image-input hash, and separately supplied reviewed source revision all match. The config digest is a separate, manually reviewed trust input from the authorized build output; copying it from this command's own registry inspection would defeat the independent binding. This repository does not yet produce a structured build-receipt artifact, so this slice must not be described as proving build-receipt provenance. That producer belongs to the separately reviewed build/push slice before live finalization. The normalized inspection is embedded in strict release schema livingip.leocleanNoSendRelease.v2; unit generation revalidates it. Release v1 has no deployed consumer and is intentionally rejected; regenerate any local v1 artifact. For this Linux-only target, inspection normalizes the deprecated Windows-only Docker ArgsEscaped field while still requiring the exact entrypoint and command arrays.

The output parent must already exist as an absolute, non-symlink directory. The output is one atomically published directory containing release.json and leoclean-gcp-nosend.service. Both files are rendered, strictly JSON-decoded, revalidated, and fsynced in a sibling temporary directory before a platform-native no-replace directory rename. An existing or concurrently created destination is never overwritten. The staged directory and parent are fsynced; a post-publication durability failure removes only the same published inode and re-fsyncs the parent. Any failure leaves no partial final bundle.

The Docker binary, config directory, and local unix:// daemon endpoint are explicit inputs; inherited DOCKER_* overrides are removed. The pull does not start a container, install a unit, restart a service, or contact Cloud SQL. Registry authentication and this pull require a separate live-read approval. The exact repository-digest reference must be absent before inspection; use a fresh isolated Docker context if it is already cached. While holding an advisory lock on the explicit Docker config directory, the command pulls, records the dynamically observed config ID, then removes the reference only if that ID is still unchanged and proves it absent before publishing the bundle. Content-addressable layers may remain. A failed pull, inspection, or cleanup returns a bounded error without forwarding Docker stderr.

Tags, alternate repositories, alternate projects/instances/service accounts, extra descriptor fields, wrong-architecture images, missing repository-digest bindings, mismatched image labels, duplicate JSON keys, and non-finite JSON values are rejected.

Offline evidence and live gate

Offline tests prove descriptor and inspection strictness, explicit local Docker authority, cache-reference rollback, atomic bundle publication, artifact and synthetic identity binding, digest-only images, pinned runtime versions, a secret-free context, the capability-drop contract, no published ports, no Docker-socket mount, no environment file, and no production/VPS/Telegram target. CI also builds exactly one linux/amd64 image, starts it with the reviewed restrictions, requires the built-in zero-adapter/no-send_message health response, checks that an unsupported send-message entrypoint command fails with the exact redacted error, and binds the running container to the dynamically resolved image ID. Before startup, the smoke also requires the built image to declare the implicit root bootstrap user, exact Python entrypoint, service command, healthcheck timings, and SIGTERM stop signal. The successful health command then proves PID 1 dropped to UID/GID 65532 with zero Linux capabilities. Finally, the smoke removes the candidate container, tag, and visible image ID. The receipt records whether linux/amd64 ran natively or through cross-platform emulation. Pinned base images and build cache may remain.

The entrypoint command rejection is not a real Hermes tool invocation, and the bridge-network smoke does not prove general network-egress denial. The offline inspection tests use exact Docker JSON fixtures; they do not prove canonical identity, Cloud SQL permissions, or the live Artifact Registry digest contents, or that teleo-staging-1 currently has a compatible container engine, enough disk, the expected architecture, the expected service account, or an unused unit name. Those are the next read-only live preflight. If the engine is absent, installation is separate infrastructure work; the deploy must stop instead of falling back to the production sync script or a mutable host virtual environment.

Publishing the draft branch and stacked PR is only a review handoff. The next deployment-evidence step must execute one authorized remote registry read plus the reversible local exact-reference cache mutation against the staging digest. A later installer slice must prove installation and rollback consume the same receipt. Live installation, Artifact Registry publication, service restart, IAM/secret changes, Cloud SQL access, and proposal staging remain separate approvals.

Rollback and sunset

This slice's rollback boundary is removal of the unpublished atomic output bundle plus removal of the exact repository-digest reference that this command introduced into an initially clean, advisory-locked cache; content-addressable layers may remain. It installs no unit and changes no running service. Restoring a prior descriptor, unit, and digest belongs to the later installer slice, which must never restart or edit the production Leo, Telegram, or VPS services.

The fresh tmpfs profile intentionally has no session continuity. That is appropriate for isolated gateway/database and fresh-turn parity proof, but it is not the production state design. Before traffic cutover, a separate reviewed slice must bind durable noncanonical session state without making it identity or knowledge authority. The tmpfs-only state contract sunsets when that cutover candidate is proven.