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decisions/internet-finance/metadao-create-futardio.md
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@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ last_updated: 2026-03-24
## Summary & Connections ## Summary & Connections
**Second attempt to create Futardio — also failed.** After the Memecoin Launchpad proposal ([[metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad]], Aug 2024) was rejected, this was a second attempt. It too failed. **Second attempt to create Futardio — also failed.** After the Memecoin Launchpad proposal (metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad, Aug 2024) was rejected, this was a second attempt. It too failed.
**Outcome:** Failed (~2024-11-25). **Outcome:** Failed (~2024-11-25).
@ -52,6 +52,6 @@ last_updated: 2026-03-24
## Relationship to KB ## Relationship to KB
- [[metadao]] — parent entity - [[metadao]] — parent entity
- [[metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad]] — first attempt (Aug 2024, failed) - metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad — first attempt (Aug 2024, failed)
- [[metadao-release-launchpad]] — third attempt that finally passed (Feb 2025) - [[metadao-release-launchpad]] — third attempt that finally passed (Feb 2025)
- [[futarchy can override its own prior decisions when new evidence emerges because conditional markets re-evaluate proposals against current information not historical commitments]] — the market eventually approved what it twice rejected - [[futarchy can override its own prior decisions when new evidence emerges because conditional markets re-evaluate proposals against current information not historical commitments]] — the market eventually approved what it twice rejected

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decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.md
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@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ last_updated: 2026-03-24
## Summary & Connections ## Summary & Connections
**Proposal 2 — pivot from Marinade to Saber vote market.** After Proposal 0 ([[metadao-develop-lst-vote-market]]) passed for a Marinade bribe platform, Marinade started building internally. Proph3t pivoted to Saber, which wanted MetaDAO to build their vote market instead. $150K funded by ecosystem consortium (UXD, BlazeStake, LP Finance, Saber). MetaDAO owns majority of platform. $62K budget for 2-month build. **Proposal 2 — pivot from Marinade to Saber vote market.** After Proposal 0 (metadao-develop-lst-vote-market) passed for a Marinade bribe platform, Marinade started building internally. Proph3t pivoted to Saber, which wanted MetaDAO to build their vote market instead. $150K funded by ecosystem consortium (UXD, BlazeStake, LP Finance, Saber). MetaDAO owns majority of platform. $62K budget for 2-month build.
**Outcome:** Passed (~2023-12-22). **Outcome:** Passed (~2023-12-22).
@ -69,4 +69,4 @@ It looks like things are coming full circle. Here, I propose that we build a vot
## Relationship to KB ## Relationship to KB
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, early product pivot - [[metadao]] — parent entity, early product pivot
- [[metadao-develop-lst-vote-market]] — Proposal 0 that led to this pivot - metadao-develop-lst-vote-market — Proposal 0 that led to this pivot

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decisions/internet-finance/metadao-increase-meta-liquidity-dutch-auction.md
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@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ last_updated: 2026-03-24
**Outcome:** Passed (2024-03-02). **Outcome:** Passed (2024-03-02).
**Connections:** **Connections:**
- The sealed-bid auction for multisig compensation is remarkable mechanism design: 10 candidates, sealed bids, lowest 4 selected. Ben H and Nico bid 0 META, joebuild bid 0.2, Dodecahedr0x bid 0.25. This is [[the Vickrey auction makes honesty the dominant strategy by paying winners the second-highest bid rather than their own]] applied informally to governance roles. - The sealed-bid auction for multisig compensation is remarkable mechanism design: 10 candidates, sealed bids, lowest 4 selected. Ben H and Nico bid 0 META, joebuild bid 0.2, Dodecahedr0x bid 0.25. This is the Vickrey auction makes honesty the dominant strategy by paying winners the second-highest bid rather than their own applied informally to governance roles.
- The Dutch auction mechanism (descending price until filled) is the precursor to the more sophisticated Dutch-auction dynamic bonding curves discussed in [[dutch-auction dynamic bonding curves solve the token launch pricing problem by combining descending price discovery with ascending supply curves]] - The Dutch auction mechanism (descending price until filled) is the precursor to the more sophisticated Dutch-auction dynamic bonding curves discussed in dutch-auction dynamic bonding curves solve the token launch pricing problem by combining descending price discovery with ascending supply curves
- "There is currently strong demand for META, with an oversubscribed raise, proposals from notable parties attempting to purchase META at below market price, and a well-known figure DCAing into META" — context: this is during the Feb-Mar 2024 period when Ben Hawkins and Pantera were also trying to buy META - "There is currently strong demand for META, with an oversubscribed raise, proposals from notable parties attempting to purchase META at below market price, and a well-known figure DCAing into META" — context: this is during the Feb-Mar 2024 period when Ben Hawkins and Pantera were also trying to buy META
- Moving all liquidity to the 1% fee pool after the auction addresses the [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — protocol-owned liquidity reduces the friction - Moving all liquidity to the 1% fee pool after the auction addresses the [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — protocol-owned liquidity reduces the friction
@ -113,4 +113,4 @@ This proposal will significantly increase Meta DAO's protocol-owned liquidity as
## Relationship to KB ## Relationship to KB
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, liquidity bootstrapping - [[metadao]] — parent entity, liquidity bootstrapping
- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — addresses liquidity friction - [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — addresses liquidity friction
- [[dutch-auction dynamic bonding curves solve the token launch pricing problem by combining descending price discovery with ascending supply curves]] — early manual implementation of Dutch auction concept - dutch-auction dynamic bonding curves solve the token launch pricing problem by combining descending price discovery with ascending supply curves — early manual implementation of Dutch auction concept

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decisions/internet-finance/metadao-migrate-meta-token.md
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@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ last_updated: 2026-03-24
**Outcome:** Passed (~2025-08-10). **Outcome:** Passed (~2025-08-10).
**Connections:** **Connections:**
- This was FORCED by the treasury exhaustion from [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-3]] — "this sale will exhaust the DAO treasury of META holdings. It is therefore critical that we plan for the eventual token migration." The Theia deal explicitly flagged this would happen. - This was FORCED by the treasury exhaustion from metadao-otc-trade-theia-3 — "this sale will exhaust the DAO treasury of META holdings. It is therefore critical that we plan for the eventual token migration." The Theia deal explicitly flagged this would happen.
- Validates [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]] — MetaDAO lived through exactly this failure mode - Validates [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]] — MetaDAO lived through exactly this failure mode
- The [[metadao-burn-993-percent-meta]] (Proposal 11) started the path: burn 99.3% → thin treasury → OTC deals deplete remainder → forced migration to mintable token - The [[metadao-burn-993-percent-meta]] (Proposal 11) started the path: burn 99.3% → thin treasury → OTC deals deplete remainder → forced migration to mintable token
- "Futarchy is market-driven decision making. To stay true to that principle, it also requires market-driven issuance" — Proph3t's framing makes mintability a philosophical commitment, not just a practical fix - "Futarchy is market-driven decision making. To stay true to that principle, it also requires market-driven issuance" — Proph3t's framing makes mintability a philosophical commitment, not just a practical fix
@ -98,6 +98,6 @@ Work on the migration is already underway and should take up to 1 week. Migratio
## Relationship to KB ## Relationship to KB
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, token architecture change - [[metadao]] — parent entity, token architecture change
- [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-3]] — treasury exhaustion that forced this migration - metadao-otc-trade-theia-3 — treasury exhaustion that forced this migration
- [[metadao-burn-993-percent-meta]] — started the path to treasury depletion - [[metadao-burn-993-percent-meta]] — started the path to treasury depletion
- [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]] — MetaDAO is the canonical case - [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]] — MetaDAO is the canonical case

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decisions/internet-finance/metadao-release-launchpad.md
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@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ last_updated: 2026-03-24
**Outcome:** Passed (~2025-03-01). Led directly to the Avici, Umbra, Solomon, OmniPair, and subsequent launches. **Outcome:** Passed (~2025-03-01). Led directly to the Avici, Umbra, Solomon, OmniPair, and subsequent launches.
**Connections:** **Connections:**
- This is the successor to the twice-rejected memecoin launchpad idea ([[metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad]] failed Aug 2024, [[metadao-create-futardio]] failed Nov 2024). The market approved the infrastructure version but not the speculative version. - This is the successor to the twice-rejected memecoin launchpad idea (metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad failed Aug 2024, [[metadao-create-futardio]] failed Nov 2024). The market approved the infrastructure version but not the speculative version.
- "If the team walks away on day #1, anyone would be able to raise a proposal to the DAO to liquidate the treasury and return all money to the funders. This is also true on day #30, day #365, and day #1083." — this is the thesis behind [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent]] - "If the team walks away on day #1, anyone would be able to raise a proposal to the DAO to liquidate the treasury and return all money to the funders. This is also true on day #30, day #365, and day #1083." — this is the thesis behind [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent]]
- The "permissioned by us at start" → "transition to permissionless" is what became the MetaDAO (curated) vs futard.io (permissionless) two-tier system - The "permissioned by us at start" → "transition to permissionless" is what became the MetaDAO (curated) vs futard.io (permissionless) two-tier system
- "Bag bias is real, and in this system it works for you as a founder" — Proph3t's insight on community-from-day-one as a feature, not a compromise - "Bag bias is real, and in this system it works for you as a founder" — Proph3t's insight on community-from-day-one as a feature, not a compromise
@ -100,5 +100,5 @@ We would also have discretion to change the mechanics of launches (e.g. to adopt
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, launchpad creation - [[metadao]] — parent entity, launchpad creation
- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — this proposal is the origin - [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — this proposal is the origin
- [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent]] — the liquidation mechanism described here - [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent]] — the liquidation mechanism described here
- [[metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad]] — earlier rejected version of this idea - metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad — earlier rejected version of this idea
- [[futarchy-governed permissionless launches require brand separation to manage reputational liability because failed projects on a curated platform damage the platforms credibility]] — "permissioned at start, permissionless later" - [[futarchy-governed permissionless launches require brand separation to manage reputational liability because failed projects on a curated platform damage the platforms credibility]] — "permissioned at start, permissionless later"