rio: extract from 2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md

- Source: inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md
- Domain: internet-finance
- Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 4)

Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ Futardio cult launch (2026-03-03 to 2026-03-04) demonstrates MetaDAO's platform
 ### Additional Evidence (extend)
 *Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
 
-The Meta-PoW proposal demonstrates a specific implementation pattern for ownership coins on MetaDAO: using token economics to create automatic treasury accumulation loops. COAL's design burns tokens at multiple points (smelting at 100 COAL per INGOT, pickaxe licenses at c(y) COAL) while channeling external hard assets (ORE) into the treasury through a single choke point (INGOT smelting at 12.10 ORE per INGOT). The proposal explicitly frames this as a 'simple, mechanical ownership coin loop' that reliably accumulates ORE in the COAL treasury and ties player behavior to COAL/ORE price dynamics. This provides a concrete example of how ownership coins can be structured beyond simple fundraising—creating ongoing economic engines that continuously accumulate treasury value through user participation rather than one-time capital raises. The Meta-PoW design shows how ownership coins can implement self-regulating feedback loops (dynamic license fees responding to price ratios) that maintain system stability without continuous governance intervention.
+(extend) COAL's Meta-PoW proposal demonstrates a new pattern for ownership coin economics: using futarchy governance to approve a complex multi-token system (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD) with algorithmic supply controls. The proposal passed on 2025-11-10 after being created on 2025-11-07, showing MetaDAO's ability to evaluate and approve sophisticated economic mechanisms through conditional markets. The system includes dynamic license fees (c(y) = c0 * (y/y_ref)^p), evergreen tool durability with 4% daily decay, and a treasury accumulation mechanism targeting ~1 ORE/day per active pickaxe. This extends MetaDAO's role beyond simple fundraising to governance of intricate token economic architectures.
 
 ---
 

domains/internet-finance/dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution.md

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ The connection to futarchy governance is important. Since [[MetaDAOs Autocrat pr
 ### Additional Evidence (extend)
 *Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
 
-COAL's Meta-PoW implements a hybrid approach that combines fixed emission schedules with dynamic access controls. The protocol maintains fixed halving-band emissions (R_t = R_0 * 2^(-k_t) where k_t advances every 5% of max supply, with R_0 = 11,250 COAL/day initially), but gates access to those emissions through dynamic pickaxe license fees c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p that respond to COAL/ORE price ratios (with baseline c0 = 200, y_ref = 50, p = 3, bounds 1-300 COAL). This creates 'algorithmic meritocracy' not through variable emission rates but through variable participation costs—when COAL strengthens (y decreases), license fees drop and more players can economically access the fixed emissions; when COAL weakens (y increases), license fees rise sharply and only committed players continue mining. The mechanism preserves emission predictability while making participation economically self-regulating. The proposal states: 'Meta-PoW does not change R_t. It defines how R_t is accessed via tools,' showing how fixed emissions can be combined with dynamic access mechanisms to create outcome-responsive systems without changing the underlying emission schedule.
+(extend) COAL's Meta-PoW implements halving-band emissions where daily emission rate R_t = R_0 * 2^(-k_t) decreases as circulation increases, with k_t = floor((C_t - C_0) / h) where h = 1,250,000 COAL (5% of 25M max supply). Initial rate R_0 = 11,250 COAL/day. However, emissions are gated through pickaxe ownership rather than distributed directly, and pickaxe crafting costs adjust dynamically via c(y) = c0 * (y/y_ref)^p based on COAL/ORE price ratio. This creates a two-layer performance mechanism: halving bands reduce base emissions over time, while dynamic license fees throttle access to those emissions based on token price performance. The combination means emission access becomes more expensive as COAL weakens (y increases), creating automatic supply discipline without governance intervention.
 
 ---
 

domains/internet-finance/dynamic-license-fees-using-price-ratio-exponents-create-automatic-supply-throttles-that-self-stabilize-without-governance-intervention.md

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-domain: internet-finance
-description: "COAL's c(y) function uses cubic price ratio to automatically increase crafting costs when COAL weakens relative to ORE, creating self-regulating supply without governance votes"
-confidence: experimental
-source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
-created: 2026-03-11
----
-
-# Dynamic license fees using price ratio exponents create automatic supply throttles that self-stabilize without governance intervention
-
-COAL's Meta-PoW implements a dynamic pickaxe license fee c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p where y = P_ORE / P_COAL, creating an automatic economic throttle that responds to relative token prices without requiring governance votes. With baseline parameters c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, p = 3, and bounds of 1 ≤ c(y) ≤ 300, the cubic exponent makes the license fee highly sensitive to price ratio changes.
-
-When COAL strengthens relative to ORE (y decreases), the license fee drops, making pickaxe crafting economically attractive. This increases mining activity, which drives more INGOT smelting and more ORE flowing into the treasury. When COAL weakens relative to ORE (y increases), the license fee rises sharply due to the cubic exponent, making new pickaxe crafting prohibitively expensive and naturally throttling supply expansion without breaking existing tool holders.
-
-The mechanism uses an EMA-smoothed TWAP for the price ratio to prevent manipulation through short-term price spikes. The license COAL is burned (not sent to treasury), making it purely a control parameter rather than a revenue stream. The proposal states: "When COAL strengthens, crafting scales up, more picks come online, more INGOT gets smelted, and more ORE flows into the treasury. If COAL weakens, crafting slows without breaking the system."
-
-The cubic exponent (p = 3) is the critical design choice—linear or quadratic functions would respond too slowly to price changes, while higher exponents would create excessive volatility. The 1-300 COAL bounds prevent the function from collapsing to zero or exploding to infinity at price extremes. This creates a self-regulating feedback loop where the system automatically adjusts mining capacity in response to market conditions.
-
----
-
-Relevant Notes:
-- [[dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution]]
-- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]
-
-Topics:
-- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
-- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/dynamic-license-fees-using-price-ratio-exponents-create-automatic-supply-throttling-in-token-economies-without-governance-intervention.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "COAL's c(y) = c0 * (y/y_ref)^p formula adjusts mining entry cost based on COAL/ORE price ratio, enabling automatic supply throttling"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Dynamic license fees using price ratio exponents create automatic supply throttling in token economies without governance intervention
+
+COAL's Meta-PoW introduces a pickaxe crafting license fee that adjusts algorithmically based on the COAL/ORE price ratio: c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p, where y = P_ORE / P_COAL. With suggested parameters c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, p = 3, and bounds c_min = 1 to c_max = 300, this creates a cubic response to price changes.
+
+When COAL strengthens relative to ORE (y decreases), the license cost drops, making pickaxe crafting economically viable for more players. This increases mining activity, INGOT smelting, and ORE inflow to the treasury. When COAL weakens relative to ORE (y increases), the license cost rises sharply (cubic exponent), throttling new pickaxe creation and reducing system load without requiring governance votes or manual intervention.
+
+The mechanism uses an EMA-smoothed TWAP for the price ratio to prevent manipulation and short-term volatility from triggering inappropriate adjustments. The license fee is paid in COAL and burned (not sent to treasury), making it a pure control parameter rather than a revenue mechanism.
+
+## Evidence
+
+From the Meta-PoW proposal:
+- "c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p, Clamped so that c_min ≤ c(y) ≤ c_max"
+- "Suggested defaults: c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, p = 3, c_min = 1, c_max = 300"
+- "When COAL is strong relative to ORE (y low): c(y) decreases, More picks are economically viable, More smelting and more ORE flows into the treasury"
+- "When COAL is weak relative to ORE (y high): c(y) increases, Crafting slows, The system self-throttles without intervention"
+- "The license is paid in COAL only. That COAL is burned, not sent to the treasury. It is a control parameter, not a revenue stream"
+- "y = P_ORE / P_COAL using an EMA-smoothed TWAP"
+
+## Mechanism Comparison
+
+This differs from fixed license fees (no price responsiveness), linear adjustments (insufficient throttling range), or governance-voted changes (too slow and politically contentious). The cubic exponent (p = 3) means a 2x increase in y produces an 8x increase in license cost, creating strong negative feedback when COAL weakens. The clamping bounds (1 to 300 COAL) prevent extreme values while preserving the core dynamic. The use of price ratio rather than absolute price makes the system robust to overall market conditions—it responds to relative value between COAL and ORE, not USD denomination.
+
+---
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-implements-evergreen-tool-economics-where-repair-costs-less-than-recrafting-creating-stable-demand-for-ingot-and-ore-treasury-inflow.md

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "COAL's Meta-PoW uses 4% daily decay with repair cheaper than recrafting to stabilize mining behavior and treasury inflow"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Meta-PoW implements evergreen tool economics where repair costs less than recrafting, creating stable demand for INGOT and predictable ORE treasury inflow
+
+COAL's Meta-PoW proposal introduces a tool durability system where pickaxes decay by 4% per day if not repaired, but repair costs (0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD daily) are deliberately set lower than the cost of crafting a new pickaxe (1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license). This creates a rational incentive for players to maintain existing tools rather than constantly recrafting, which stabilizes the number of active mining tools and creates predictable demand for INGOT smelting.
+
+The evergreen design means tools never permanently break—skipped repairs accumulate as debt that can be paid later to restore full power. This eliminates the boom-bust cycle of tool creation and abandonment that would destabilize treasury inflows.
+
+The calibration targets approximately 1 ORE per day flowing to the COAL treasury per fully maintained pickaxe. Since repair is cheaper than recrafting, rational players maintain their gear, making the count of active fully-repaired picks the key state variable for predicting ORE accumulation.
+
+## Evidence
+
+From the Meta-PoW proposal:
+- "Each pick has power p between 0 and 1. If repaired for the day, p stays at 1. If not repaired, p decays by 4% per day: p_next = 0.96 * p"
+- "Daily repair cost to maintain full power: r_ing_total INGOT, 0.3 WOOD. Current calibration: r_ing_total ≈ 0.082643 INGOT per day"
+- "Crafting a pickaxe: 1 INGOT, 8 WOOD, c(y) COAL burned as a license"
+- "Tools are evergreen and cheaper to repair than to recraft, so players maintain their gear instead of churning it"
+- "A fully maintained pick effectively corresponds to about 1 ORE/day of smelt demand into the treasury"
+
+## Mechanism Design
+
+The repair-vs-recraft ratio is the critical parameter. If repair were more expensive than recrafting, players would abandon degraded tools and craft new ones, creating volatile INGOT demand. By making repair consistently cheaper, the system incentivizes tool longevity and transforms mining behavior from episodic crafting to continuous maintenance.
+
+The 4% daily decay rate creates meaningful pressure (tools lose half their power in ~17 days without repair) while the accumulated repair debt mechanism prevents permanent tool loss. This design converts what would be a discrete, bursty economic activity (crafting new tools) into a smooth, predictable flow (daily repairs), enabling the treasury to model ORE inflow as a function of active tool count.
+
+---
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-implements-evergreen-tool-economy-where-repair-cost-undercuts-replacement-creating-stable-demand-for-ingot-and-ore-treasury-inflow.md

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-domain: internet-finance
-description: "COAL's Meta-PoW uses 4% daily decay and repair costs below replacement to incentivize tool maintenance over churn, creating predictable ORE treasury inflow"
-confidence: experimental
-source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
-created: 2026-03-11
----
-
-# Meta-PoW implements evergreen tool economy where repair cost undercuts replacement creating stable demand for INGOT and ORE treasury inflow
-
-COAL's Meta-PoW protocol creates economic incentives for tool maintenance rather than replacement by making daily repair cheaper than recrafting. Pickaxes decay at 4% per day if not repaired, but repair costs only 0.082643 INGOT plus 0.3 WOOD versus the full crafting cost of 1 INGOT, 8 WOOD, and a dynamic COAL license fee c(y). This cost structure makes rational players maintain existing tools rather than constantly recraft, creating predictable steady-state demand for INGOT smelting.
-
-The evergreen design solves the churn problem that would otherwise create volatile ORE inflows. Since each fully maintained pickaxe is calibrated to drive approximately 1 ORE per day into the treasury through INGOT repair demand (at 12.10 ORE per INGOT), the number of active maintained picks becomes the key state variable for treasury accumulation. Players who skip repairs accumulate debt (missed repair costs) but can restore full power by paying the accumulated cost, preventing permanent tool loss while maintaining economic pressure to repair.
-
-This mechanism creates a continuous ORE sink into the COAL treasury that scales with active player count rather than with speculative crafting cycles. The repair-versus-replace economics are the load-bearing structure that makes the "ownership coin" loop function as designed. The proposal explicitly states: "Tools are evergreen and cheaper to repair than to recraft, so players maintain their gear instead of churning it."
-
----
-
-Relevant Notes:
-- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
-- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests]]
-
-Topics:
-- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/separating-ore-payment-to-smelting-only-creates-single-choke-point-for-treasury-accumulation-making-economic-flows-auditable-and-predictable.md

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-domain: internet-finance
-description: "Meta-PoW channels all ORE inflows through INGOT smelting only, creating a single auditable point for treasury accumulation rather than distributing fees across multiple operations"
-confidence: experimental
-source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
-created: 2026-03-11
----
-
-# Separating ORE payment to smelting only creates single choke point for treasury accumulation making economic flows auditable and predictable
-
-COAL's Meta-PoW protocol requires ORE payment only at INGOT smelting (μ ORE per INGOT, currently 12.10 ORE), while pickaxe crafting and repair consume INGOT but pay no additional ORE. This architectural choice creates a single point where ORE enters the treasury, making the economic model transparent and auditable. All ORE paid at smelting goes directly to the COAL treasury with no intermediate distribution.
-
-The single-choke-point design means INGOT becomes "on-chain proof of COAL burn plus ORE fee," functioning as a treasury receipt. Since pickaxe repair requires 0.082643 INGOT per day to maintain full power, and each INGOT represents 12.10 ORE paid at smelting, the system creates a direct mathematical relationship: one fully maintained pickaxe drives approximately 1 ORE per day into the treasury (0.082643 × 12.10 ≈ 1.0).
-
-This contrasts with designs that charge fees at multiple points (craft, repair, mining). By concentrating ORE payment at smelting, the protocol makes treasury accumulation predictable from observable on-chain state (number of active maintained picks) without requiring complex fee accounting across multiple transaction types. The proposal explicitly states: "ORE enters only at smelt. No ORE is charged at craft or repair. INGOT is the on-chain proof of COAL burn plus ORE fee."
-
-The design also prevents fee evasion—since INGOT is required for all tool operations and can only be created by paying ORE at smelting, there is no way to participate in the mining economy without contributing to treasury accumulation. The calibration parameter μ can be adjusted by governance to change the ORE/day target per pick, but the single-payment architecture remains constant.
-
----
-
-Relevant Notes:
-- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
-- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests]]
-
-Topics:
-- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
-- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/treasury-inflow-mechanisms-that-separate-burn-from-payment-enable-dual-optimization-of-supply-control-and-asset-accumulation.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "COAL separates COAL burns from ORE payments to independently optimize supply control and treasury accumulation"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Treasury inflow mechanisms that separate burn from payment enable dual optimization of supply control and asset accumulation
+
+COAL's Meta-PoW architecture burns COAL at two distinct points—pickaxe license fees and INGOT smelting—but only captures ORE treasury inflow at the smelting step. This separation creates independent optimization surfaces: COAL burns control token supply and mining entry costs, while ORE payments accumulate hard assets in the treasury without being coupled to the burn rate.
+
+The pickaxe license c(y) burns COAL as a dynamic throttle on mining activity but sends nothing to the treasury. The smelting process burns 100 COAL per INGOT and requires a payment of μ ORE (currently ~12.10 ORE) that goes entirely to the COAL treasury. This means the treasury accumulates ORE at a rate determined by INGOT demand (driven by tool crafting and repair), while COAL supply is controlled by both license burns and smelting burns.
+
+The design allows governance to tune treasury accumulation (by adjusting μ) independently from supply throttling (by adjusting license parameters c0, y_ref, p). A single combined burn-and-payment mechanism would force tradeoffs between these objectives: if license fees required ORE payment, treasury inflow would spike during COAL strength (when licenses are cheap and crafting increases) but the system would accumulate less ORE per active tool. By concentrating ORE payment at smelting, the treasury inflow becomes proportional to active tool count rather than tool creation rate.
+
+## Evidence
+
+From the Meta-PoW proposal:
+- "To smelt 1 INGOT: Burn 100 COAL, Pay μ ORE to the COAL treasury. Current μ ≈ 12.10 ORE per INGOT"
+- "ORE enters only at smelt. No ORE is charged at craft or repair"
+- "Crafting a pickaxe: 1 INGOT, 8 WOOD, c(y) COAL burned as a license"
+- "The license is paid in COAL only. That COAL is burned, not sent to the treasury. It is a control parameter, not a revenue stream"
+- "All ORE paid at smelt goes to the COAL treasury"
+- "Each active, fully repaired pick is designed to support approximately: 1 ORE per day of inflow to the treasury, 8.26 COAL per day burned via smelting"
+
+## Design Rationale
+
+The separation also makes the system more legible: ORE/day to treasury ≈ number of fully maintained picks, because each pick requires ~0.082643 INGOT/day for repair, and each INGOT requires μ ORE at smelting. This creates a simple mental model for treasury growth that governance can use to calibrate μ independently from license curve parameters.
+
+---
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

entities/internet-finance/coal-meta-pow-ore-treasury-protocol.md

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
----
-type: entity
-entity_type: decision_market
-name: "COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol"
-domain: internet-finance
-status: passed
-parent_entity: "[[coal]]"
-platform: "futardio"
-proposer: "futard.io"
-proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg"
-proposal_account: "G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg"
-proposal_number: 4
-proposal_date: 2025-11-07
-resolution_date: 2025-11-10
-category: "mechanism"
-summary: "Introduces Meta-PoW economic model that moves mining power into pickaxes and creates deterministic ORE treasury accumulation through INGOT smelting"
-tracked_by: rio
-created: 2026-03-11
----
-
-# COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol
-
-## Summary
-The Meta-PoW proposal establishes COAL's core economic model by creating a loop where players craft pickaxes using COAL, INGOT, and WOOD; mine COAL with those pickaxes; and smelt INGOT by burning COAL and paying ORE to the treasury. The design makes tools evergreen (cheaper to repair than replace), concentrates all ORE payments at the smelting choke point, and uses dynamic license fees c(y) based on COAL/ORE price ratios to automatically throttle supply without governance intervention.
-
-## Market Data
-- **Outcome:** Passed
-- **Proposer:** futard.io
-- **Proposal Account:** G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
-- **DAO Account:** 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
-- **Autocrat Version:** 0.3
-- **Created:** 2025-11-07
-- **Completed:** 2025-11-10
-
-## Mechanism Design
-The proposal implements three key economic mechanisms:
-
-1. **Evergreen Tools:** Pickaxes decay 4% daily if not repaired but cost only 0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD to repair versus 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL to recraft, incentivizing maintenance over churn
-
-2. **Single ORE Choke Point:** All ORE flows into treasury through INGOT smelting (12.10 ORE per INGOT), with no ORE charged at craft or repair, making treasury accumulation auditable and predictable
-
-3. **Dynamic License Throttle:** Pickaxe crafting requires burning c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p COAL where y = P_ORE / P_COAL, creating automatic supply adjustment (baseline: c0=200, y_ref=50, p=3, bounds 1-300)
-
-Calibration targets ~1 ORE/day treasury inflow per fully maintained pickaxe.
-
-## Significance
-This proposal demonstrates a specific implementation pattern for ownership coins: using token burn mechanics and external asset accumulation to create self-regulating economic loops. The cubic price-ratio exponent in the license fee and the repair-versus-replace economics are novel mechanism design choices that could inform future futarchy-governed token economies.
-
-The proposal also shows MetaDAO's governance evolution—allowing "parameters to be slightly adjusted by the core team before launch, upon feedback from the community" rather than requiring new proposals for minor calibration changes.
-
-## Relationship to KB
-- [[coal]] - core economic model implementation
-- [[ore]] - treasury accumulation asset
-- [[futardio]] - governance platform
-- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] - ownership coin implementation example

entities/internet-finance/coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: passed
+parent_entity: "[[futardio]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "coal project team"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg"
+proposal_account: "G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg"
+proposal_number: 4
+proposal_date: 2025-11-07
+resolution_date: 2025-11-10
+category: "mechanism"
+summary: "Introduces Meta-PoW economic model with dynamic license fees, evergreen tool durability, and ORE treasury accumulation"
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol
+
+## Summary
+
+The Meta-PoW proposal establishes a sustainable economic model for COAL by creating a multi-token system (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD) with algorithmic supply controls. Players forge INGOT using COAL and ORE, craft pickaxes using COAL, INGOT, and WOOD, then mine COAL with pickaxes. The system features dynamic license fees that adjust based on COAL/ORE price ratio (c(y) = c0 * (y/y_ref)^p), evergreen tool durability with 4% daily decay but cheaper repair than recrafting, and a treasury accumulation mechanism targeting approximately 1 ORE per day per fully maintained pickaxe.
+
+## Market Data
+
+- **Outcome:** Passed
+- **Proposer:** coal project team
+- **Created:** 2025-11-07
+- **Completed:** 2025-11-10
+- **Proposal Account:** G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
+- **DAO Account:** 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
+- **Autocrat Version:** 0.3
+
+## Significance
+
+This proposal demonstrates MetaDAO's ability to evaluate and approve complex token economic architectures through futarchy governance. The Meta-PoW system introduces several novel mechanisms:
+
+1. **Dual-burn architecture:** COAL burns at pickaxe licensing (control parameter) and INGOT smelting (coupled with ORE payment), creating independent optimization surfaces for supply control and treasury accumulation
+
+2. **Dynamic throttling:** License fee c(y) uses cubic exponent (p=3) on price ratio, creating 8x cost increase when COAL/ORE ratio doubles, providing automatic supply discipline without governance intervention
+
+3. **Evergreen tool economics:** 4% daily decay with repair costs (0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD) deliberately set lower than recrafting costs (1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + license) to stabilize mining behavior and create predictable treasury inflows
+
+The proposal allows core team parameter adjustments before launch based on community feedback, showing pragmatic governance that balances mechanism design with implementation flexibility.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+
+- [[futardio]] — governance decision on economic model
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — extends MetaDAO's role to complex mechanism approval
+- [[dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution]] — implements halving-band emissions gated by dynamic license fees

entities/internet-finance/coal.md

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: company
+name: "COAL"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: active
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# COAL
+
+## Overview
+
+COAL is a mineable token project on Solana implementing a multi-token economic system (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD) with proof-of-work mining mechanics. The project uses futarchy governance through MetaDAO/Futardio to approve economic model changes. COAL has a fixed max supply of 25,000,000 tokens with halving-band emissions that decrease every 5% of max supply added to circulation.
+
+## Timeline
+
+- **2025-11-07** — [[coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] proposed: Meta-PoW economic model with dynamic license fees, evergreen tool durability, and ORE treasury accumulation mechanism
+- **2025-11-10** — [[coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] passed: Approved Meta-PoW as new COAL economic model through futarchy governance
+
+## Relationship to KB
+
+- [[futardio]] — governance platform
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — uses MetaDAO futarchy for economic model governance

entities/internet-finance/futardio.md

@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ MetaDAO's token launch platform. Implements "unruggable ICOs" — permissionless
 
 - **2026-03-07** — Areal DAO launch: $50K target, raised $11,654 (23.3%), REFUNDING status by 2026-03-08 — first documented failed futarchy-governed fundraise on platform
 - **2026-03-04** — [[seekervault]] fundraise launched targeting $75,000, closed next day with only $1,186 (1.6% of target) in refunding status
+- **2025-11-07** — [[coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] proposed: COAL Meta-PoW economic model with dynamic license fees and ORE treasury accumulation
+- **2025-11-10** — [[coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] passed: Approved complex multi-token economic architecture through futarchy governance
 ## Competitive Position
 - **Unique mechanism**: Only launch platform with futarchy-governed accountability and treasury return guarantees
 - **vs pump.fun**: pump.fun is memecoin launch (zero accountability, pure speculation). Futardio is ownership coin launch (futarchy governance, treasury enforcement). Different categories despite both being "launch platforms."

inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md

@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 processed_by: rio
 processed_date: 2026-03-11
-claims_extracted: ["meta-pow-implements-evergreen-tool-economy-where-repair-cost-undercuts-replacement-creating-stable-demand-for-ingot-and-ore-treasury-inflow.md", "dynamic-license-fees-using-price-ratio-exponents-create-automatic-supply-throttles-that-self-stabilize-without-governance-intervention.md", "separating-ore-payment-to-smelting-only-creates-single-choke-point-for-treasury-accumulation-making-economic-flows-auditable-and-predictable.md"]
+claims_extracted: ["meta-pow-implements-evergreen-tool-economics-where-repair-costs-less-than-recrafting-creating-stable-demand-for-ingot-and-ore-treasury-inflow.md", "dynamic-license-fees-using-price-ratio-exponents-create-automatic-supply-throttling-in-token-economies-without-governance-intervention.md", "treasury-inflow-mechanisms-that-separate-burn-from-payment-enable-dual-optimization-of-supply-control-and-asset-accumulation.md"]
 enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md", "dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution.md"]
 extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
-extraction_notes: "Extracted three mechanism design claims about evergreen tool economics, dynamic license throttles, and single-choke-point treasury accumulation. Created decision_market entity for the Meta-PoW proposal. Enriched two existing claims about ownership coins and dynamic token distribution. The proposal contains detailed economic parameters but these are factual specifications rather than arguable claims—preserved as key_facts for reference."
+extraction_notes: "Extracted 3 mechanism design claims about evergreen tool economics, dynamic license fees, and dual-burn treasury architecture. Created decision_market entity for the Meta-PoW proposal and company entity for COAL project. Enriched 2 existing claims about MetaDAO's role and dynamic token minting. The proposal demonstrates futarchy governance of complex multi-token economic systems with algorithmic supply controls."
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -276,14 +276,10 @@ Vote NO – keep the current model unchanged.
 ## Key Facts
 - COAL max supply: 25,000,000 tokens
 - COAL halving bands: every 5% of max supply (1,250,000 COAL)
-- Initial daily emissions: R_0 = 11,250 COAL/day
-- INGOT smelting cost: 100 COAL + 12.10 ORE per INGOT
-- Pickaxe crafting cost: 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license
-- Daily pickaxe repair cost: 0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD
-- Pickaxe decay rate: 4% per day if not repaired
-- Axe crafting cost: 1 INGOT + 6 WOOD
-- Daily axe repair cost: 0.082643 INGOT + 0.25 WOOD
-- License fee baseline: c0=200 COAL, y_ref=50, p=3, bounds 1-300 COAL
-- Proposal account: G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
-- DAO account: 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
-- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Initial emission rate: 11,250 COAL/day
+- INGOT smelting cost: 100 COAL + ~12.10 ORE
+- Pickaxe crafting: 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license
+- Daily pickaxe repair: ~0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD
+- Tool decay rate: 4% per day if not repaired
+- License fee formula: c(y) = 200 * (y/50)^3, clamped between 1-300 COAL
+- Target treasury inflow: ~1 ORE/day per fully maintained pickaxe