extract: 2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model

- Applied 1 entity operations from queue
- Files: entities/internet-finance/metadao.md

Pentagon-Agent: Epimetheus <968B2991-E2DF-4006-B962-F5B0A0CC8ACA>

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md

@@ -103,6 +103,12 @@ MetaDAO Q3 2024 roadmap prioritized launching a market-based grants product as t
 
 Ranger Finance ICO completed in April 2025, adding ~$9.1M to total Assets Under Futarchy, bringing the total to $57.3M across 10 launched projects. This represents continued momentum in futarchy-governed capital formation, with Ranger being a leveraged trading platform on Solana. The article also notes MetaDAO was 'considering strategic changes to its platform model' around this time, though details were not specified.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2025-10-06-futardio-launch-umbra]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Umbra raised $3M through MetaDAO's futard.io platform (Oct 6-10, 2025) with $154.9M total committed against $750K target, demonstrating 206x oversubscription. This is concrete evidence of MetaDAO's operational capacity to facilitate large-scale futarchy-governed capital raises.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md

@@ -83,6 +83,12 @@ Proposal #3 on MetaDAO (account EXehk1u3qUJZSxJ4X3nHsiTocRhzwq3eQAa6WKxeJ8Xs) ra
 
 Production deployment data from futard.io shows Proposal #1 on DAO account De8YzDKudqgeJXqq6i7q82AgxxrQ1JXXfMgouQuPyhY using Autocrat version 0.3, with proposal created, ended, and completed all on 2025-03-05. This confirms operational use of the Autocrat v0.3 implementation in live governance.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Dean's List DAO treasury proposal required TWAP > 3% for passage, with the proposal arguing potential 5-20% FDV increase from de-risking would exceed this threshold. Proposal completed December 5, 2024 after 3-day duration.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-enables-conditional-ownership-coins.md

@@ -6,6 +6,12 @@ description: MetaDAO's Futardio platform demonstrates that futarchy governance c
 confidence: likely
 tags: [futarchy, token-design, governance, ownership, liquidation-rights]
 created: 2026-02-15
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+COAL's Meta-PoW demonstrates ownership coin mechanics applied to in-game economies: the proposal passed futarchy governance (proposal G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg, completed 2025-11-10) and establishes a treasury accumulation mechanism where ORE flows are proportional to active player engagement, creating a direct link between usage and treasury value.
+
 ---
 
 # Futarchy enables conditional ownership coins with liquidation rights

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md

@@ -26,6 +26,12 @@ The risk is that cultural proposals introduce systematic bias: participants who
 
 The single data point is limited. One passed proposal doesn't establish a reliable pattern. Cultural proposals that fail futarchy governance (and thus go unobserved in public records) would provide the necessary counter-evidence to calibrate how often futarchy actually validates cultural versus financial spending.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Dean's List DAO's fee increase proposal included switching quote token from mSOL back to SOL, a decision with no direct revenue impact but potential effects on user experience and composability. The futarchy market approved this alongside the fee changes, suggesting it priced the operational simplification and ecosystem alignment as net positive for token value despite being a 'cultural' rather than purely financial decision.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md

@@ -50,10 +50,22 @@ However, this case provides concrete evidence that [[futarchy adoption faces fri
 Drift's $8,250 creator competition proposal failed despite having clear upside potential (community engagement, content generation, B.E.T awareness) and minimal downside risk. The proposal offered a structured prize pool across multiple tracks (video, Twitter threads, trade ideas) with established evaluation criteria, yet still failed to generate sufficient market participation. This is a canonical example of participation friction killing an economically sensible proposal.
 
 
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Dean's List treasury proposal passed despite requiring active market participation to price a 40 percentage point survival probability improvement. The proposal explicitly calculated that potential FDV increase (5-20%) exceeded the 3% TWAP threshold, suggesting the economics were clearly favorable yet still required formal market validation.
+
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Dean's List DAO fee structure proposal passed despite requiring traders to actively migrate to new pools and accept 20x higher fees (0.25% to 5%). The proposal explicitly acknowledged potential 20-30% volume decrease but passed anyway, suggesting the market priced the net treasury benefit (~$19k-25k annual growth) as worth the migration friction. This demonstrates that futarchy can approve proposals with significant user friction when the economic benefit is clear.
+
+
 ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
 *Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
 
-The Dean's List proposal passed with detailed economic modeling showing 5.33% FDV increase exceeding 3% TWAP threshold, suggesting favorable economics drove approval. The proposal included worked examples with specific price impact calculations (24% upward pressure, 15% downward from sells) demonstrating clear positive expected value.
+The Dean's List DAO proposal passed futarchy governance despite requiring complex economic modeling (FDV calculations, TWAP projections, multi-step cash flow analysis) to evaluate. The proposal included detailed scenarios showing 5.33% FDV increase exceeding 3% TWAP requirements, but this level of financial sophistication creates evaluation barriers for typical token holders.
 
 ---
 

domains/internet-finance/internet capital markets compress fundraising from months to days because permissionless raises eliminate gatekeepers while futarchy replaces due diligence bottlenecks with real-time market pricing.md

@@ -54,6 +54,12 @@ Futardio cult raised $11.4M in under 24 hours through MetaDAO's futarchy platfor
 
 MetaDAO ICO platform processed 8 project launches between April 2025 and January 2026, raising $25.6M total. Each ICO operated through defined subscription windows with pro-rata allocation, compressing capital formation to single-day events. $390M in committed demand across 8 launches demonstrates that permissionless futarchy-governed raises can aggregate capital at scale without traditional due diligence bottlenecks. Platform generated $300M in trading volume, indicating liquid secondary markets formed immediately post-launch.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2025-10-06-futardio-launch-umbra]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Umbra completed its raise in 4 days (Oct 6-10, 2025) through MetaDAO's futarchy platform, raising $3M final allocation from $154.9M committed. This provides empirical confirmation of sub-week fundraising timelines for futarchy-governed raises.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/internet-capital-markets-compress-fundraising-timelines.md

@@ -6,6 +6,12 @@ description: Platforms like Futardio demonstrate that internet-native capital ma
 confidence: likely
 tags: [capital-markets, fundraising, speed, internet-finance]
 created: 2026-02-20
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2025-10-18-futardio-launch-loyal]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Loyal completed a $2.5M raise in 4 days (October 18-22, 2025) through Futardio's futarchy-governed ICO platform, demonstrating the compression of fundraising from traditional months-long processes to sub-week execution.
+
 ---
 
 # Internet capital markets compress fundraising timelines to hours

domains/internet-finance/metadao-ico-platform-demonstrates-15x-oversubscription-validating-futarchy-governed-capital-formation.md

@@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ The source presents no failure cases despite eight ICOs, which suggests either s
 
 Avici achieved 17x oversubscription ($34.2M committed vs $2M target), exceeding the previously documented 15x benchmark and demonstrating continued strong market demand for futarchy-governed raises.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2025-10-18-futardio-launch-loyal]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Loyal's fundraise achieved 151x oversubscription ($75.9M committed vs $500K target), far exceeding the previously documented 15x pattern. The final raise settled at $2.5M, suggesting the platform's conditional market mechanisms successfully filtered commitment from actual capital deployment.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ The proposal passed MetaDAO governance but represents a single implementation wi
 ### Additional Evidence (extend)
 *Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
 
-The Dean's List DAO proposal demonstrates buyback model with specific mechanics: 80% of USDC revenue used to purchase $DEAN tokens, distributed to DAO citizens as payment, while 20% DAO tax remains in USDC as hedge. Example shows 2500 USDC dApp review generates 2000 USDC in $DEAN purchases (560k tokens), with 80% citizen sell pressure (448k tokens) still resulting in net positive price action. Model projects 5.33% FDV increase from 6 monthly reviews, exceeding 3% TWAP requirement.
+The Dean's List DAO implemented a treasury buyback model where 80% of USDC revenue (2000 USDC per 2500 USDC dApp review) purchases $DEAN tokens distributed to DAO citizens, with 20% retained as USDC tax. The model assumes 80% of distributed tokens are immediately sold, creating net positive price action where 'buys exceeded sells by 20%' and 'the price will always achieve a higher low on each cycle.' With 400 USDC daily purchases against 500 USDC baseline volume (80% increase), they projected 24% upward price pressure offset by 15% downward pressure from citizen selling, yielding 5.33% FDV increase versus 3% TWAP requirement.
 
 ---
 

entities/internet-finance/metadao.md

@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ The futarchy governance protocol on Solana. Implements decision markets through
 - **2024-01-24** — Proposed AMM program to replace CLOB markets, addressing liquidity fragmentation and state rent costs (Proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG)
 - **2024-01-29** — AMM proposal passed with 400 META on approval and 800 META on completion budget
 - **2024-08-31** — Passed proposal to enter services agreement with Organization Technology LLC, creating US entity vehicle for paying contributors with $1.378M annualized burn rate. Entity owns no IP (all owned by MetaDAO LLC) and cannot encumber MetaDAO LLC. Agreement cancellable with 30-day notice or immediately for material breach.
+- **2024-03-19** — Colosseum proposed $250,000 OTC acquisition of META tokens with dynamic pricing (TWAP-based up to $850, void above $1,200) and 12-month vesting; proposal passed 2024-03-24
 ## Key Decisions
 | Date | Proposal | Proposer | Category | Outcome |
 |------|----------|----------|----------|---------|

inbox/archive/.extraction-debug/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.json

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+{
+  "rejected_claims": [
+    {
+      "filename": "meta-pow-creates-ore-treasury-accumulation-through-ingot-smelting-fees-that-scale-with-coal-mining-demand.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "filename": "dynamic-license-costs-using-price-ratios-create-self-throttling-token-emission-systems-without-governance-intervention.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "filename": "evergreen-tool-design-with-repair-cheaper-than-replacement-creates-stable-demand-patterns-in-token-economies.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "filename": "halving-band-emissions-with-5-percent-supply-increments-create-predictable-long-tail-token-distribution.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "validation_stats": {
+    "total": 4,
+    "kept": 0,
+    "fixed": 7,
+    "rejected": 4,
+    "fixes_applied": [
+      "meta-pow-creates-ore-treasury-accumulation-through-ingot-smelting-fees-that-scale-with-coal-mining-demand.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
+      "meta-pow-creates-ore-treasury-accumulation-through-ingot-smelting-fees-that-scale-with-coal-mining-demand.md:stripped_wiki_link:futarchy-enables-conditional-ownership-coins.md",
+      "meta-pow-creates-ore-treasury-accumulation-through-ingot-smelting-fees-that-scale-with-coal-mining-demand.md:stripped_wiki_link:MetaDAO-is-the-futarchy-launchpad-on-Solana-where-projects-r",
+      "dynamic-license-costs-using-price-ratios-create-self-throttling-token-emission-systems-without-governance-intervention.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
+      "dynamic-license-costs-using-price-ratios-create-self-throttling-token-emission-systems-without-governance-intervention.md:stripped_wiki_link:dynamic-performance-based-token-minting-replaces-fixed-emiss",
+      "evergreen-tool-design-with-repair-cheaper-than-replacement-creates-stable-demand-patterns-in-token-economies.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
+      "halving-band-emissions-with-5-percent-supply-increments-create-predictable-long-tail-token-distribution.md:set_created:2026-03-15"
+    ],
+    "rejections": [
+      "meta-pow-creates-ore-treasury-accumulation-through-ingot-smelting-fees-that-scale-with-coal-mining-demand.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
+      "dynamic-license-costs-using-price-ratios-create-self-throttling-token-emission-systems-without-governance-intervention.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
+      "evergreen-tool-design-with-repair-cheaper-than-replacement-creates-stable-demand-patterns-in-token-economies.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
+      "halving-band-emissions-with-5-percent-supply-increments-create-predictable-long-tail-token-distribution.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
+    ]
+  },
+  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
+  "date": "2026-03-15"
+}

inbox/archive/2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model.md

@@ -153,8 +153,12 @@ This way we create volume (3600 \$USDC volume) and the price action is always po
 
 
 ## Key Facts
-- The Dean's List DAO FDV was $337,074 at proposal time with 100M circulating $DEAN supply at $0.00337 price
+- The Dean's List DAO charges 2500 USDC per dApp review
+- The Dean's List DAO FDV was $337,074 at proposal time
 - The Dean's List DAO daily trading volume was $500 at proposal time
-- Proposal modeled 6 dApp reviews per month at 2500 USDC each generating 15,000 USDC monthly revenue
+- $DEAN circulating supply: 100,000,000 tokens
+- $DEAN price at proposal: $0.00337
+- Proposal assumed 6 dApp reviews per month generating 15,000 USDC monthly revenue
+- Tax distribution: 20% to treasury (3,000 USDC), 80% to $DEAN purchases (12,000 USDC)
 - Proposal account: 5c2XSWQ9rVPge2Umoz1yenZcAwRaQS5bC4i4w87B1WUp
-- Proposal number 3 for DAO account 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ
+- Proposal completed and ended: 2024-07-22

inbox/archive/2024-08-30-futardio-proposal-approve-budget-for-pre-governance-hackathon-development.md

@@ -6,9 +6,12 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/2LKqzegdHrcrrRCHSuTS2fMjjJuZDfzuRKMnzPhzeD4
 date: 2024-08-30
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-16
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -161,3 +164,12 @@ Future is building a comprehensive pre-governance platform for DAOs and crypto p
 - Autocrat version: 0.3
 - Completed: 2024-09-02
 - Ended: 2024-09-02
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- FutureDAO proposal 2LKqzegdHrcrrRCHSuTS2fMjjJuZDfzuRKMnzPhzeD42 approved $25,000 for Pre-Governance Mandates tool
+- Pre-Governance Mandates tool targets Solana-based DAOs and professional proposal builders
+- Tool features include multi-criteria decision-making engine, customizable surveys, Web3 integration, AI-powered analysis, and mandates dashboard
+- Budget breakdown: Decision-Making Engine & API ($5k), Mandates Wizard ($3k), dApp Frontend ($7k), dApp Backend ($5k), Documentation & Graphics ($5k)
+- FutureDAO positions Pre-Governance Mandates as complementary to MetaDAO, Realms, Squads, and Align
+- Potential monetization models include $FUTURE staking, monthly payments, pay-as-you-go, and consultancy services

inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md

@@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuA
 date: 2025-11-07
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-15
+enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-enables-conditional-ownership-coins.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -265,3 +269,19 @@ Vote NO – keep the current model unchanged.
 - Autocrat version: 0.3
 - Completed: 2025-11-10
 - Ended: 2025-11-10
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- COAL Meta-PoW proposal account: G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
+- COAL proposal number: 4
+- COAL DAO account: 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
+- Meta-PoW proposal created 2025-11-07, completed 2025-11-10
+- COAL max supply: 25,000,000 tokens
+- COAL initial daily emissions: 11,250 tokens/day
+- COAL halving band size: 1,250,000 tokens (5% of max supply)
+- INGOT smelting cost: 100 COAL + ~12.10 ORE
+- Pickaxe crafting cost: 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license
+- Pickaxe daily repair cost: ~0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD
+- Tool power decay rate: 4% per day if not repaired
+- License cost formula: c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p, with c0=200, y_ref=50, p=3, c_min=1, c_max=300
+- GUI planned for minechain.gg