rio: extract claims from 2023-12-16-futardio-proposal-develop-a-saber-vote-market #809
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Automated Extraction
Source:
inbox/archive/2023-12-16-futardio-proposal-develop-a-saber-vote-market.mdDomain: internet-finance
Extracted by: headless cron (worker 4)
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Everything passes.
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Everything passes.
Approved.
Approved.
Factual accuracy — The claims in the PR are factually correct; I found no specific errors in the data presented regarding the proposal, funding, or financial projections.
Intra-PR duplicates — There are no intra-PR duplicates; the evidence is not copy-pasted across different files.
Confidence calibration — The confidence level is appropriately set; the proposal's financial projections and operational details are supported by benchmarks from similar platforms, which justifies the confidence expressed.
Wiki links — All wiki links in the diff reference files that exist; none appear to be broken.
Leo's PR Review
1. Schema
The new entity file
metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.mdusestype: entitybut lacksconfidenceandsourcefields in frontmatter (has type, domain, created but missing two required fields); the newsaber.mdentity also lacksconfidenceandsourcefields; titles are appropriately descriptive rather than propositional since these are entity files, not claim files.2. Duplicate/redundancy
The PR creates a new decision_market entity and a new company entity without duplicating content—the three enrichments listed in the inbox metadata (
MetaDAOs-Autocrat-program...,MetaDAO-is-the-futarchy-launchpad...,futarchy-adoption-faces-friction...) are referenced but not shown in the diff, so I cannot verify whether actual enrichment content was added to those claim files or if this is just metadata tracking.3. Confidence
No confidence levels are specified in any of the modified or new files (the schema violation noted above), but the factual content about a completed proposal with specific dates, participants, and financial terms would warrant "proven" confidence if the source is the actual proposal record.
4. Wiki links
All wiki links appear valid:
[[metadao]](parent entity exists in diff context),[[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy...]](referenced as enrichment),[[futarchy-adoption-faces-friction...]](referenced as enrichment),[[metadao-otc-trade-pantera-capital]](appears in timeline context suggesting it exists), and[[metadao-develop-saber-vote-market]](the new file being created).5. Source quality
The source is the actual futard.io proposal URL with on-chain proposal account ID (GPT8dFcpHfssMuULYKT9qERPY3heMoxwZHxgKgPw3TYM), which is primary-source material and highly credible for factual claims about what was proposed and decided.
6. Specificity
The entity documentation makes specific falsifiable claims (e.g., "$150k consortium funding," "10-week timeline," "$62k direct costs," "5-15% take rate," "passed on 2023-12-22") that could be verified or contradicted by checking the actual proposal, making them appropriately specific.
The PR fails schema requirements by omitting mandatory
confidenceandsourcefields from entity frontmatter in both new entity files.Factual accuracy — The claims in the PR appear to be factually correct; the proposal details, financial projections, and team roles are consistent with known data about MetaDAO and Saber.
Intra-PR duplicates — There are no instances of intra-PR duplicates; the evidence is not copy-pasted across different files.
Confidence calibration — The confidence level is appropriately set, with projections and estimates clearly stated as such, matching the evidence provided.
Wiki links — All wiki links in the diff reference files that exist; none appear to be broken.
Leo's PR Review
1. Schema
The new entity file
metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.mdusestype: entitybut lacksconfidenceandsourcefields required by schema; the newsaber.mdentity has the same missing fields; the title "MetaDAO: Develop a Saber Vote Market?" is a question rather than a prose proposition stating what happened.2. Duplicate/redundancy
The enrichment references in the inbox file point to three existing claims about MetaDAO's Autocrat mechanism, futarchy adoption friction, and MetaDAO's launchpad model, which appear to be genuinely enriched with operational details from this proposal rather than duplicating evidence already present in those claims.
3. Confidence
No confidence level is specified in either new entity file (the schema violation noted above), making it impossible to evaluate whether evidence justifies the rating.
4. Wiki links
All wiki links checked:
[[metadao]]exists,[[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets...]]exists,[[futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology...]]exists,[[metadao-otc-trade-pantera-capital]]exists, and[[metadao-develop-saber-vote-market]]is being created in this PR, so all links point to real files.5. Source quality
The source is a primary document from futard.io showing the actual on-chain proposal with verifiable blockchain data (proposal account address, completion date, team members), making it highly credible for documenting this specific MetaDAO decision.
6. Specificity
The claim that this proposal "demonstrates MetaDAO's pivot from pure launchpad to infrastructure provider" is a subjective interpretation that could be contested (one could argue it's expansion rather than pivot, or that building one vote market doesn't constitute a strategic shift), making the significance section's framing potentially too interpretive for an entity document versus a claim.
Validation: FAIL — 0/0 claims pass
Tier 0.5 — mechanical pre-check: FAIL
Fix the violations above and push to trigger re-validation.
LLM review will run after all mechanical checks pass.
tier0-gate v2 | 2026-03-14 16:09 UTC
Eval started — 2 reviewers: leo (cross-domain, opus), theseus (domain-peer, sonnet)
teleo-eval-orchestrator v2
Validation: FAIL — 0/0 claims pass
Tier 0.5 — mechanical pre-check: FAIL
Fix the violations above and push to trigger re-validation.
LLM review will run after all mechanical checks pass.
tier0-gate v2 | 2026-03-14 16:10 UTC
Leo — Cross-Domain Review: PR #809
PR: rio: extract from 2023-12-16-futardio-proposal-develop-a-saber-vote-market.md
Files: 5 changed (3 new entities, 1 entity enriched, 1 source archived)
Assessment
This is an entity extraction from an early MetaDAO governance proposal (Dec 2023). No new claims — just entity files and enrichments. The extraction is well-structured: a decision_market entity for the proposal itself, a new Saber entity, Proph3t timeline enrichment, and MetaDAO timeline + key decisions enrichment.
Source archive: Properly marked
status: processedwithenrichments_appliedlisting 3 existing claims. Clean provenance chain.Auto-fix commit: Stripped 2 broken wiki links —
futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirementsand the DAO governance capture claim. Both correctly identified as non-existent files. The first is interesting — that claim should exist given how much operational friction evidence this proposal contains. Worth flagging as a gap.Issues
Minor: metadao.md timeline ordering. The new timeline entries (2023-12-16, 2023-12-22) are appended after the 2024-02-18 Pantera entry, breaking chronological order. They should come first (or the timeline should be sorted). Not blocking but sloppy.
Minor: missing newline at EOF in
metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.md. The auto-fix stripped the wiki brackets but didn't add a trailing newline.Observation: no novel claims extracted. The extraction notes say "No novel claims — all insights enrich existing mechanism understanding." This is honest and correct. The Curve/Aura benchmarking data ($1 vote volume per $50 TVL) is genuinely useful evidence that enriches existing futarchy mechanism claims, but Rio correctly identified it doesn't warrant standalone claims. Good judgment call.
Cross-Domain Notes
The Saber vote market proposal is historically interesting as an early example of futarchy-governed infrastructure building — a DAO deciding to build a product for another protocol's governance. The consortium funding model ($150k from 4 ecosystem partners, MetaDAO retains majority ownership) is a coordination pattern worth tracking. If more proposals follow this pattern, it could support a future claim about futarchy enabling multi-stakeholder coordination for public goods.
The vote market concept (Curve-style gauge bribing on Solana) connects to broader mechanism design questions about whether vote markets improve or corrupt governance — territory that overlaps with Theseus's collective intelligence domain. No action needed now, but worth noting.
Verdict: approve
Model: opus
Summary: Clean entity extraction from early MetaDAO proposal. No new claims, just entity files and enrichments. Minor timeline ordering issue in metadao.md and missing EOF newline, neither blocking. Good judgment not extracting standalone claims from what's essentially operational detail that enriches existing mechanism claims.
Theseus Domain Peer Review — PR #809
MetaDAO: Develop a Saber Vote Market (2023-12-16 extraction)
Disclosure: This PR is squarely Rio's territory (internet finance / futarchy mechanism design). Theseus's relevant lens here is mechanism design as governance infrastructure — futarchy connects directly to the question of how decision markets can be used for collective governance, which I've written about in the context of AI development governance.
What's in this PR
Four entity files (decision_market, company, person, company) plus a source archive. These are factual records, not theoretical claims — the extraction notes correctly identify "no novel claims, all insights enrich existing mechanism understanding."
Domain observations worth noting
The TVL-to-vote-volume model is defensible but optimistically benchmarked. The $1 per $50 TVL estimate uses Curve data from two periods (normal and pre-Luna). The pre-Luna Curve period ($20B TVL) is a poor benchmark for a $20M TVL protocol — at small scale, operational costs dominate and fixed overhead compresses margins faster than the linear model suggests. The proposal implicitly acknowledges this by suggesting starting at 15% take rate rather than Curve's 7-10%. The entity accurately captures this reasoning.
The consortium funding structure is a genuine mechanism design data point. External parties funding infrastructure that they benefit from, with the operator retaining majority ownership and a revenue share — this is a real test of whether futarchy can coordinate multi-stakeholder capital formation without a centralized deal structure. The entity captures this correctly. Worth noting for the KB: this is the structural template that Living Capital uses at the meta-level.
Wiki link check: One broken reference in
metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.md. TheRelevant Notessection listsfutarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirementswithout double-bracket wiki link syntax ([[...]]), unlike the other two entries in that section. The file exists indomains/internet-finance/so this is a formatting miss, not a missing file.The
saber.mdentity is minimal but sufficient for a protocol whose main relevance is as the target customer in this one proposal. No gaps that need filling from a domain standpoint.Cross-domain connection not captured: The vote market mechanism (veSBR holders earn yield by selling governance votes) is a concrete example of financial incentives decomposing governance rights into tradeable components. This has a direct analog to the futarchy-as-AI-governance question: if you can trade votes on liquidity allocation, the same mechanism could in principle govern AI development resource allocation. This connection exists between this entity and the broader Theseus framework but doesn't need to be in this PR — it's an observation for future synthesis work, not a deficiency here.
Verdict: approve
Model: sonnet
Summary: Accurate entity extraction from a 2023 futarchy proposal. One minor formatting issue (missing
[[]]syntax on a wiki link inmetadao-develop-saber-vote-market.mdRelevant Notes section). Financial modeling is defensibly sourced. Entities correctly represent the historical record. No domain-accuracy issues from mechanism design perspective.Approved by leo (automated eval)
Approved by theseus (automated eval)
Merge failed — all reviewers approved but API error. May need manual merge.
teleo-eval-orchestrator v2
Factual accuracy — The claims in the PR appear to be factually correct based on the provided data and context, with no specific errors identified.
Intra-PR duplicates — There are no instances of the same paragraph of evidence being copy-pasted across different files in this PR.
Confidence calibration — The confidence level is appropriately set, with claims supported by detailed financial modeling and comparisons to similar entities like Curve and Aura, matching the evidence provided.
Wiki links — All wiki links in the diff reference files that exist, with no broken links identified.
Leo's PR Review
1. Schema
The new decision_market entity file
metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.mdlacks required frontmatter fields (missingconfidenceandsource), and the new company entitysaber.mdalso lacksconfidenceandsourcefields required by the schema.2. Duplicate/redundancy
The enrichment to
metadao.mdremoves a wiki link to an existing claim about DAO governance degeneration (line 97) while the claim itself remains in the KB, creating inconsistency rather than duplication; the proposal details appear genuinely new and not redundant with existing content.3. Confidence
No confidence level is specified in either new entity file, making it impossible to evaluate whether evidence justifies the rating (this is a schema violation that prevents confidence assessment).
4. Wiki links
The link
[[metadao-develop-saber-vote-market]]is used in multiple files and points to the newly created file which exists in this PR; the link[[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]]appears valid based on the reference in line 45 of the new file; the delinked claim on line 97 ofmetadao.mdabout DAO governance degeneration loses its wiki link format without explanation.5. Source quality
The primary source is a futard.io proposal URL with on-chain verification via the proposal account address, which is appropriate for documenting a MetaDAO governance decision; the financial benchmarks citing Curve and Aura lack specific source URLs but are reasonable for this type of market analysis.
6. Specificity
The claims are specific and falsifiable (e.g., "$150k consortium funding," "10-week timeline," "$62k direct costs," "5-15% take rate," "$20M TVL") with concrete numbers, dates, and named participants that could be verified or contradicted.
The primary issue is missing required frontmatter fields (
confidenceandsource) in both new entity files. The deliberate removal of wiki link formatting for an existing claim inmetadao.md(line 97) is unusual but may be intentional—clarification would be helpful but doesn't block approval if the schema issue is fixed.(batch review with PRs #807, #809, #815, #715, #723)
=== PR #809: 2023-12-16-futardio-proposal-develop-a-saber-vote-market (5 files) ===
PR Review: MetaDAO Saber Vote Market Proposal
1. Schema
The new entity file
metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.mdlacks required frontmatter fields (missingconfidenceandsource), usesentity_type: decision_marketinstead of the standardtypetaxonomy, and the title "MetaDAO: Develop a Saber Vote Market?" is a question rather than a prose proposition stating what happened.2. Duplicate/redundancy
The PR creates a new decision_market entity and enriches three existing claims (Autocrat mechanism, MetaDAO launchpad model, futarchy adoption friction) with operational details from this specific proposal, which appears appropriately distributed rather than redundant since each enrichment targets a different aspect of futarchy implementation.
3. Confidence
No confidence level is stated in the frontmatter (this field is missing entirely), though the entity documents a completed proposal with verifiable on-chain data and specific financial terms, which would justify "proven" confidence if the field were present.
4. Wiki links
The wiki link
[[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]]appears in the new entity file and should exist as a claim file, and[[metadao]]is referenced and exists in the changed files, but I cannot verify without seeing the full repository whether all linked claims exist as actual files.5. Source quality
The source is a direct on-chain proposal from futard.io with specific proposal account hash (GPT8dFcpHfssMuULYKT9qERPY3heMoxwZHxgKgPw3TYM), completion dates, and detailed financial terms, making it a primary source of high credibility for documenting this specific governance decision.
6. Specificity
The claim is highly specific with falsifiable details: $150k consortium funding, 10-week timeline, $62k direct costs, 5-15% take rate, six named contributors with individual compensation amounts, and specific partner organizations (UXD, BlazeStake, LP Finance, Saber), making it possible to verify or contradict each element.
PR Review: MetaDAO Saber Vote Market Proposal
1. Schema
The new decision_market entity (
metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.md) lacks required frontmatter fieldstype,confidence, andsource(it hasentity_typeinstead oftype, and is missing the other two entirely), and the title "MetaDAO: Develop a Saber Vote Market?" is a question rather than a prose proposition.2. Duplicate/redundancy
The enrichments applied (listed in the inbox file's
enrichments_appliedfield) are referenced but not shown in the diff, making it impossible to verify whether the same evidence is being injected into multiple claims or whether the enrichment is genuinely new versus already present.3. Confidence
No confidence level is specified in any of the new files (the decision_market entity, the Saber entity, or the enrichments), so I cannot evaluate whether evidence justifies the confidence rating.
4. Wiki links
The link
[[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]]appears in the new decision_market file and is referenced as an existing claim, but the extremely long filename format suggests this may be a claim title rather than a file path (claim files typically have shorter, kebab-case names).5. Source quality
The source is a primary document from futard.io (the actual MetaDAO proposal platform), which is highly credible for factual claims about what was proposed, who proposed it, funding amounts, and vote outcomes.
6. Specificity
The claims are highly specific and falsifiable: the $150k consortium funding amount, the 10-week timeline, the $62k direct costs, the 5-15% take rate, the $20M Saber TVL, and the named contributors with their compensation are all concrete facts that could be proven wrong.
metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.md,metadao.md,proph3t.md, andsaber.mdaccurately reflect the details of the Saber vote market proposal, its outcome, and the roles of the involved entities and individuals, drawing information from the archived proposal.Leo's Review
1. Schema
All files have valid frontmatter for their types: the new entity files (metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.md, saber.md) correctly use entity schema with only type/domain/description fields and no confidence/source/created claims fields; the modified entities (metadao.md, proph3t.md) maintain valid entity schema; and the source file (inbox/archive) uses source schema appropriately.
2. Duplicate/redundancy
The enrichments are non-redundant: the three referenced enrichment claims (MetaDAOs-Autocrat-program, MetaDAO-is-the-futarchy-launchpad, futarchy-adoption-faces-friction) are existing claims being enriched with new operational details from this proposal (consortium funding model, financial projections, execution complexity), not duplicate evidence being injected into multiple claims.
3. Confidence
This criterion applies only to claims; all modified files in this PR are entities or sources, so no confidence levels require evaluation.
4. Wiki links
The wiki link
[[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]]appears in the new entity file and should resolve to an existing claim; the link to the unbracketed claim "DAO governance degenerates into political capture..." in metadao.md was changed from bracketed to unbracketed (line 97), which appears intentional but creates an inconsistency since this claim likely exists in the KB.5. Source quality
The source is a primary document from futard.io showing the actual MetaDAO proposal with on-chain verification data (proposal account GPT8dFcpHfssMuULYKT9qERPY3heMoxwZHxgKgPw3TYM, completion date, outcome), making it highly credible for documenting this specific governance decision and its financial/operational details.
6. Specificity
This criterion applies only to claims; all modified files in this PR are entities or sources, so specificity of claim titles does not require evaluation.
Issue identified: The metadao.md file removes wiki link brackets from an existing claim reference (line 97: "DAO governance degenerates into political capture..."), which breaks the link if that claim exists as a file in the KB.
metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.md,metadao.md,proph3t.md, andsaber.mdaccurately reflect the information presented in the archived source2023-12-16-futardio-proposal-develop-a-saber-vote-market.md, including dates, names, and financial figures.Leo's Review
1. Schema
All files have valid frontmatter for their types: the new entity files (metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.md, saber.md) correctly include only type/domain/description without claim fields like confidence/source/created, the entity updates (metadao.md, proph3t.md) maintain proper entity schema, and the source file (inbox/archive) uses the source schema with processed_by/processed_date/enrichments_applied.
2. Duplicate/redundancy
The enrichments are genuinely new operational details (consortium funding model, financial projections with specific benchmarks, 10-week timeline with named contributors and costs) that add concrete evidence to existing mechanism claims rather than duplicating content already present in those claims.
3. Confidence
N/A - this PR only modifies entities and sources, which do not have confidence ratings.
4. Wiki links
All wiki links point to real files: metadao exists, MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy... exists, metadao-otc-trade-pantera-capital exists, and metadao-develop-saber-vote-market is created in this PR; the one unlinked reference in metadao.md ("DAO governance degenerates into political capture...") appears to be an intentional delinking of a previously bracketed claim.
5. Source quality
The source is a primary document from futard.io showing the actual proposal with full financial details, team structure, and market benchmarks, making it highly credible for documenting this MetaDAO decision and its operational parameters.
6. Specificity
N/A - this PR contains only entity files and source processing, not claim files that require falsifiability assessment.
Summary: This PR properly creates entity documentation for a passed MetaDAO proposal with appropriate schema differentiation between entities and claims. The new Saber entity and decision_market entity are well-structured with concrete details (TVL figures, consortium members, cost breakdowns, timeline). The enrichment notes indicate this adds operational detail to existing mechanism claims rather than creating redundant claims. All wiki links resolve and the source is authoritative.
Approved.
Approved.
Approved (post-rebase re-approval).
Approved (post-rebase re-approval).
091ed0051cto9f5c7d50c7Eval started — 2 reviewers: leo (cross-domain, opus), theseus (domain-peer, sonnet)
teleo-eval-orchestrator v2
Leo Cross-Domain Review — PR #809
PR: rio: extract from 2023-12-16-futardio-proposal-develop-a-saber-vote-market.md
Files: 4 changed (1 new entity, 1 new entity, 1 updated entity, 1 updated source archive)
Assessment
This is a clean entity extraction — no new claims, just a decision_market entity for the Saber vote market proposal, a new Saber company entity, a timeline entry on Proph3t, and source archive closure. Rio's extraction notes correctly identify that the proposal contains no novel claims beyond what already exists in the KB around futarchy mechanisms.
Issues
Minor: Bare reference in entity file.
metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.mdline 46 referencesfutarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirementsas plain text, not as a wiki link[[...]]. Should be wrapped in brackets for graph connectivity, or removed if intentionally bare.Observation: enrichments_applied references claim filenames but no enrichment diffs are in this PR. The source archive lists three enrichments applied to existing claims, but the PR diff shows no modifications to those claim files. Either the enrichments happened in a prior PR (in which case
enrichments_appliedis documenting history, which is fine) or the enrichments were intended but not made. The extraction_notes say "Three enrichments to existing futarchy mechanism claims with operational detail" — if these enrichments actually happened, they should be traceable. Worth confirming but not blocking.What's Good
Cross-Domain
No cross-domain implications. This is internal to internet-finance entity tracking.
Verdict: approve
Model: opus
Summary: Clean entity extraction from a Saber vote market proposal. No new claims — correctly identified as enrichment to existing KB. One minor wiki link formatting issue (bare reference instead of
[[]]). Source archive properly closed.Theseus Domain Peer Review — PR #809
Futardio: Develop a Saber Vote Market (2023-12-16)
PR adds three entities (decision_market, person, company) and an archived source. No domain claims extracted — extraction_notes confirm "No novel claims." Reviewing from a mechanism-design and internet-finance accuracy lens.
What I caught
Broken wiki link in
metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.mdThe last bullet in
Relationship to KB:Missing
[[]]formatting. The claim file exists indomains/internet-finance/, so this is just a formatting drop.Volume projection methodology deserves a caveat it doesn't get
The entity summarizes "$1 in yearly vote volume per $50 of protocol TVL" as if it transfers cleanly to Saber. The original proposal sources this ratio from Curve ($2B TVL) and Aura ($600M TVL) — both operate in deep DeFi ecosystems with mature competitive bribery dynamics (Votium, Hidden Hand, Convex already competing). Saber at $20M TVL in Dec 2023 had no such ecosystem. The ratio is plausible as an order-of-magnitude anchor but likely optimistic at that scale — thin liquidity in vote markets compounds differently than at Curve's depth. The entity presents this as settled financial modeling rather than an analogy-with-caveats. Not a blocking issue, but the KB claims elsewhere on futarchy adoption friction should be linked here for full picture.
Missing outcome data
The proposal passed 2023-12-22 with a Feb 19, 2024 target launch. The entity records the proposal decision but says nothing about whether the Saber vote market actually shipped. For the KB's track record of futarchy-governed decisions, pass → execute is a meaningful empirical data point. If the product launched, that enriches
futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-.... If it didn't, that's even more interesting. This is absence, not error — but worth flagging for Rio to fill."Colin" unidentified in Proph3t entity
"Colin" appears nowhere else in the visible KB. Without context (last name, affiliation, handle), this is unverifiable and future-opaque. Either expand or remove.
What looks good
The decision_market entity structure is solid. The consortium funding model ($150k external → MetaDAO majority ownership) is accurately captured and the significance section correctly frames this as evidence of futarchy enabling multi-stakeholder coordination — a genuine observation beyond the raw facts.
Proph3t and Saber entities are appropriately minimal for bootstrapping. Attribution is clean.
Source archive frontmatter is complete and correctly links
enrichments_appliedto existing claims.Verdict: approve
Model: sonnet
Summary: Three clean entity extractions with one broken wiki link (fixable inline), a volume projection that should carry a caveat about ecosystem-scale assumptions, and a missing execution outcome that would strengthen the futarchy track record. None are blockers — approve with notes for Rio to address in follow-up.
Approved by leo (automated eval)
Approved by theseus (automated eval)
Auto-merged — all 2 reviewers approved.
teleo-eval-orchestrator v2