4ca838c6f5
- Source: inbox/archive/2025-02-06-futardio-proposal-should-sanctum-implement-cloud-staking-and-active-staking-re.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 2) Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
4 KiB
| type | entity_type | name | domain | status | parent_entity | platform | proposer | proposal_url | proposal_account | dao_account | proposal_date | resolution_date | autocrat_version | category | summary | tracked_by | created |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| entity | decision_market | Sanctum: Should Sanctum implement CLOUD staking and active staking rewards? | internet-finance | passed | sanctum | futardio | proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2 | https://www.futard.io/proposal/4BTTxsV98Rhm1qjDe2yPdXtj7j7KBSuGtVQ6rUNWjjXf | 4BTTxsV98Rhm1qjDe2yPdXtj7j7KBSuGtVQ6rUNWjjXf | 5n61x4BeVvvRMcYBMaorhu1MaZDViYw6HghE8gwLCvPR | 2025-02-06 | 2025-02-09 | 0.3 | mechanism | Implement 30-day vesting staking lockups and allocate 30M CLOUD (3% supply) to active staking rewards conditional on governance participation | rio | 2026-03-11 |
Sanctum: Should Sanctum implement CLOUD staking and active staking rewards?
Summary
Sanctum's first governance proposal (CLOUD-1) implements two mechanisms to improve futarchy governance: (1) staked CLOUD (sCLOUD) with 30-day linearly vesting lockups as the base asset for conditional markets, designed to mitigate Keynesian beauty contest dynamics by selecting for long-term holders; (2) active staking rewards (ASR) distributing 30M CLOUD (3% of total supply) over six months to participants based on (stake × time) × (proposals participated in), with a 10 USDC minimum trading volume threshold per proposal.
The proposal passed 2025-02-09 after a three-day voting period. Implementation is phased: staking and participation tracking begin immediately, but the transition from CLOUD/USDC to sCLOUD/USDC markets is delayed until users are comfortable with the mechanism.
Market Data
- Outcome: Passed
- Proposer: proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2
- Proposal Account: 4BTTxsV98Rhm1qjDe2yPdXtj7j7KBSuGtVQ6rUNWjjXf
- DAO Account: 5n61x4BeVvvRMcYBMaorhu1MaZDViYw6HghE8gwLCvPR
- Autocrat Version: 0.3
- Proposal Cadence: Every two weeks (1 week deliberation + 3 day voting)
Mechanism Details
Staking Lockups:
- 30-day linearly vesting (unstaking 100 sCLOUD releases ~3.3 CLOUD/day)
- Designed to filter for long-term holders vs. short-term speculators
- Eventual transition to sCLOUD/USDC markets (delayed for user education)
Active Staking Rewards:
- 30M CLOUD total allocation (3% of supply)
- Two 15M tranches distributed quarterly
- Pro rata formula: (staked CLOUD × time) × (proposals participated in)
- Minimum 10 USDC trading volume per proposal to qualify
- First distribution ~3 months after passage
Significance
This is the first production implementation of staking lockups specifically designed to address futarchy's Keynesian beauty contest problem. The proposal explicitly theorizes that vesting lockups create selection effects where long-term aligned holders face lower opportunity cost than momentum traders, potentially improving prediction market accuracy.
The active staking rewards mechanism addresses the free-rider problem in governance by making participation directly profitable, but introduces new questions about whether volume-based rewards attract genuine evaluation or mercenary capital.
The phased rollout (tracking participation before enforcing sCLOUD markets) reveals adoption friction: even committed futarchy projects face user comprehension barriers that require gradual onboarding.
Relationship to KB
- sanctum — first governance decision
- MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window — uses Autocrat v0.3
- futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements — confirms adoption barriers
- staking-lockups-mitigate-futarchy-beauty-contest-by-selecting-for-long-term-holders — mechanism design rationale
- active-staking-rewards-incentivize-futarchy-participation-by-compensating-governance-effort — participation incentive design