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- Source: inbox/archive/2025-02-06-futardio-proposal-should-sanctum-implement-cloud-staking-and-active-staking-re.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 2) Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
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4 KiB
Markdown
67 lines
No EOL
4 KiB
Markdown
---
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type: entity
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entity_type: decision_market
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name: "Sanctum: Should Sanctum implement CLOUD staking and active staking rewards?"
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domain: internet-finance
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status: passed
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parent_entity: "[[sanctum]]"
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platform: "futardio"
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proposer: "proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2"
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proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/4BTTxsV98Rhm1qjDe2yPdXtj7j7KBSuGtVQ6rUNWjjXf"
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proposal_account: "4BTTxsV98Rhm1qjDe2yPdXtj7j7KBSuGtVQ6rUNWjjXf"
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dao_account: "5n61x4BeVvvRMcYBMaorhu1MaZDViYw6HghE8gwLCvPR"
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proposal_date: 2025-02-06
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resolution_date: 2025-02-09
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autocrat_version: "0.3"
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category: "mechanism"
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summary: "Implement 30-day vesting staking lockups and allocate 30M CLOUD (3% supply) to active staking rewards conditional on governance participation"
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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# Sanctum: Should Sanctum implement CLOUD staking and active staking rewards?
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## Summary
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Sanctum's first governance proposal (CLOUD-1) implements two mechanisms to improve futarchy governance: (1) staked CLOUD (sCLOUD) with 30-day linearly vesting lockups as the base asset for conditional markets, designed to mitigate Keynesian beauty contest dynamics by selecting for long-term holders; (2) active staking rewards (ASR) distributing 30M CLOUD (3% of total supply) over six months to participants based on (stake × time) × (proposals participated in), with a 10 USDC minimum trading volume threshold per proposal.
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The proposal passed 2025-02-09 after a three-day voting period. Implementation is phased: staking and participation tracking begin immediately, but the transition from CLOUD/USDC to sCLOUD/USDC markets is delayed until users are comfortable with the mechanism.
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## Market Data
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- **Outcome:** Passed
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- **Proposer:** proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2
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- **Proposal Account:** 4BTTxsV98Rhm1qjDe2yPdXtj7j7KBSuGtVQ6rUNWjjXf
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- **DAO Account:** 5n61x4BeVvvRMcYBMaorhu1MaZDViYw6HghE8gwLCvPR
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- **Autocrat Version:** 0.3
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- **Proposal Cadence:** Every two weeks (1 week deliberation + 3 day voting)
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## Mechanism Details
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**Staking Lockups:**
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- 30-day linearly vesting (unstaking 100 sCLOUD releases ~3.3 CLOUD/day)
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- Designed to filter for long-term holders vs. short-term speculators
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- Eventual transition to sCLOUD/USDC markets (delayed for user education)
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**Active Staking Rewards:**
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- 30M CLOUD total allocation (3% of supply)
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- Two 15M tranches distributed quarterly
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- Pro rata formula: (staked CLOUD × time) × (proposals participated in)
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- Minimum 10 USDC trading volume per proposal to qualify
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- First distribution ~3 months after passage
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## Significance
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This is the first production implementation of staking lockups specifically designed to address futarchy's Keynesian beauty contest problem. The proposal explicitly theorizes that vesting lockups create selection effects where long-term aligned holders face lower opportunity cost than momentum traders, potentially improving prediction market accuracy.
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The active staking rewards mechanism addresses the free-rider problem in governance by making participation directly profitable, but introduces new questions about whether volume-based rewards attract genuine evaluation or mercenary capital.
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The phased rollout (tracking participation before enforcing sCLOUD markets) reveals adoption friction: even committed futarchy projects face user comprehension barriers that require gradual onboarding.
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[sanctum]] — first governance decision
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — uses Autocrat v0.3
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — confirms adoption barriers
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- [[staking-lockups-mitigate-futarchy-beauty-contest-by-selecting-for-long-term-holders]] — mechanism design rationale
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- [[active-staking-rewards-incentivize-futarchy-participation-by-compensating-governance-effort]] — participation incentive design |