- Source: inbox/archive/2025-02-06-futardio-proposal-should-sanctum-implement-cloud-staking-and-active-staking-re.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 5) Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
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| type | entity_type | name | domain | status | parent_entity | platform | proposer | proposal_url | proposal_date | resolution_date | category | summary | tracked_by | created |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| entity | decision_market | Sanctum: Should Sanctum implement CLOUD staking and active staking rewards? | internet-finance | passed | sanctum | futardio | proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2 | https://www.futard.io/proposal/4BTTxsV98Rhm1qjDe2yPdXtj7j7KBSuGtVQ6rUNWjjXf | 2025-02-06 | 2025-02-09 | mechanism | Implement CLOUD staking with 30-day vesting lockup and allocate 30M CLOUD (3% supply) to active staking rewards | rio | 2026-03-11 |
Sanctum: Should Sanctum implement CLOUD staking and active staking rewards?
Summary
This proposal implemented two mechanism changes to Sanctum's futarchy governance: (1) staked CLOUD (sCLOUD) with 30-day linearly vesting lockup as the base asset for conditional market participation, and (2) 30M CLOUD (3% of total supply) allocated to reward active governance participants based on staking duration and vote frequency.
Market Data
- Outcome: Passed
- Proposer: proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2
- Proposal Number: CLOUD-1 (Sanctum's first futarchy proposal)
- Platform: Futardio (Autocrat v0.3)
- Resolution: 2025-02-09
Mechanism Design
Staking lockup:
- 30-day linearly vesting unstaking (~3.3 CLOUD/day per 100 sCLOUD)
- Rationale: mitigate Keynesian beauty contest by filtering for long-term holders
- Gradual transition: will move from CLOUD/USDC to sCLOUD/USDC markets after "people are comfortable"
Active staking rewards:
- 30M CLOUD total (3% of supply)
- Formula: (staked amount × time) × (votes participated in)
- Minimum: 10 USDC trading volume per proposal to qualify
- Distribution: Two 15M tranches, quarterly, first ~3 months after passage
- Proposal cadence: Every two weeks (1 week deliberation + 3 day voting)
Significance
This is the first documented case of a project extending MetaDAO's base Autocrat mechanism with custom participation incentives and lockup mechanics. The proposal explicitly identifies the Keynesian beauty contest as "the primary potential failure mode of futarchy" and positions staking lockups as a mitigation strategy. The active rewards mechanism tests whether explicit incentives can overcome the learning curve and time investment barriers to futarchy participation.
Relationship to KB
- sanctum - governance mechanism implementation
- futardio - platform used
- MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window - base mechanism being extended