teleo-codex/entities/internet-finance/sanctum-implement-cloud-staking-active-rewards.md
Teleo Agents 5d82d112ad rio: extract from 2025-02-06-futardio-proposal-should-sanctum-implement-cloud-staking-and-active-staking-re.md
- Source: inbox/archive/2025-02-06-futardio-proposal-should-sanctum-implement-cloud-staking-and-active-staking-re.md
- Domain: internet-finance
- Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 5)

Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
2026-03-12 06:43:39 +00:00

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Raw Blame History

type entity_type name domain status parent_entity platform proposer proposal_url proposal_date resolution_date category summary tracked_by created
entity decision_market Sanctum: Should Sanctum implement CLOUD staking and active staking rewards? internet-finance passed sanctum futardio proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2 https://www.futard.io/proposal/4BTTxsV98Rhm1qjDe2yPdXtj7j7KBSuGtVQ6rUNWjjXf 2025-02-06 2025-02-09 mechanism Implement CLOUD staking with 30-day vesting lockup and allocate 30M CLOUD (3% supply) to active staking rewards rio 2026-03-11

Sanctum: Should Sanctum implement CLOUD staking and active staking rewards?

Summary

This proposal implemented two mechanism changes to Sanctum's futarchy governance: (1) staked CLOUD (sCLOUD) with 30-day linearly vesting lockup as the base asset for conditional market participation, and (2) 30M CLOUD (3% of total supply) allocated to reward active governance participants based on staking duration and vote frequency.

Market Data

  • Outcome: Passed
  • Proposer: proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2
  • Proposal Number: CLOUD-1 (Sanctum's first futarchy proposal)
  • Platform: Futardio (Autocrat v0.3)
  • Resolution: 2025-02-09

Mechanism Design

Staking lockup:

  • 30-day linearly vesting unstaking (~3.3 CLOUD/day per 100 sCLOUD)
  • Rationale: mitigate Keynesian beauty contest by filtering for long-term holders
  • Gradual transition: will move from CLOUD/USDC to sCLOUD/USDC markets after "people are comfortable"

Active staking rewards:

  • 30M CLOUD total (3% of supply)
  • Formula: (staked amount × time) × (votes participated in)
  • Minimum: 10 USDC trading volume per proposal to qualify
  • Distribution: Two 15M tranches, quarterly, first ~3 months after passage
  • Proposal cadence: Every two weeks (1 week deliberation + 3 day voting)

Significance

This is the first documented case of a project extending MetaDAO's base Autocrat mechanism with custom participation incentives and lockup mechanics. The proposal explicitly identifies the Keynesian beauty contest as "the primary potential failure mode of futarchy" and positions staking lockups as a mitigation strategy. The active rewards mechanism tests whether explicit incentives can overcome the learning curve and time investment barriers to futarchy participation.

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