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- Source: inbox/archive/2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 3) Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
3.4 KiB
| type | entity_type | name | domain | status | parent_entity | platform | proposer | proposal_url | proposal_date | resolution_date | category | summary | key_metrics | tracked_by | created | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| entity | decision_market | MetaDAO: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy? | internet-finance | passed | metadao | futardio | joebuild | https://www.futard.io/proposal/CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG | 2024-01-24 | 2024-01-29 | mechanism | Proposal to migrate MetaDAO's futarchy implementation from CLOBs to AMMs to solve liquidity, manipulation, and state rent problems |
|
rio | 2026-03-11 |
MetaDAO: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy?
Summary
Proposal to replace MetaDAO's CLOB-based futarchy markets with AMMs using liquidity-weighted time-average pricing and 3-5% fees. The migration addresses three problems with the existing Autocrat v0.1 implementation: lack of liquidity from wide bid-ask spreads, manipulation vulnerability through selective cranking and wash trading, and high state rent costs of 3.75 SOL per market pair.
Market Data
- Outcome: Passed
- Proposer: joebuild
- Created: 2024-01-24
- Completed: 2024-01-29
- Budget: 400 META on passing proposal, 800 META on completed migration
Significance
This represents MetaDAO's first major mechanism upgrade after initial launch, addressing operational friction that limited trading volume and created manipulation vulnerabilities. The migration from CLOBs to AMMs is a simplification move that trades off some flexibility (one-sided liquidity provision) for better liquidity bootstrapping and manipulation resistance through high fees. The proposal demonstrates how production futarchy systems must iterate on theoretical designs to handle real-world constraints around liquidity, state rent, and attack vectors.
The implementation includes quality-of-life improvements like loosening time restrictions on proposal creation (currently 50 slots) and automatic reversion to fail status if proposal instructions don't execute, showing how operational experience reveals friction points in governance mechanisms.
Technical Details
- AMM tracks liquidity-weighted average price over proposal lifetime
- 3-5% fees discourage manipulation while incentivizing LPs
- Proposers must lock initial liquidity and set starting prices
- State rent drops from 3.75 SOL per market to near-zero
- Removes 1 META minimum order size requirement
- Includes feature to permissionlessly pause swaps and return positions after verdict
- Includes feature to permissionlessly close AMMs and return state rent SOL when no positions remain
Implementation Team
- Program changes: joebuild
- Program review: TBD expert in MetaDAO
- Frontend integration: 0xNalloK
Relationship to KB
- metadao - mechanism upgrade
- MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window - extends with AMM implementation details
- futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements - confirms liquidity as primary friction
- futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders - challenges with real manipulation vulnerabilities