- What: Rewrote all 27 existing MetaDAO governance decision records with full verbatim proposal text, correct URLs, Summary & Connections - Includes META-032 (DBA/Variant $6M OTC rejection) — previously had sparse summary, now has full proposal text + $879K volume data + pass/fail TWAP spread showing -64% pass vs +0.5% fail - Combined with batch 1 (5 new), all 32 MetaDAO governance proposals are now complete with full text Pentagon-Agent: Rio <5551F5AF-0C5C-429F-8915-1FE74A00E019>
107 lines
7.8 KiB
Markdown
107 lines
7.8 KiB
Markdown
---
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type: decision
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entity_type: decision_market
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name: "MetaDAO: Develop Multi-Option Proposals?"
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domain: internet-finance
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status: passed
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parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
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platform: metadao
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proposer: "agrippa"
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proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/J7dWFgSSuMg3BNZBAKYp3AD5D2yuaaLUmyKqvxBZgHht"
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proposal_date: 2024-02-20
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resolution_date: 2024-02-25
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category: mechanism
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summary: "Proposal 9 — Build multi-modal proposals (multiple mutually exclusive outcomes beyond pass/fail). 200 META across 4 milestones. By agrippa (ex-Realms lead dev, Cornell crypto research). Estimated +12.1% DAO value."
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key_metrics:
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proposal_number: 9
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proposal_account: "J7dWFgSSuMg3BNZBAKYp3AD5D2yuaaLUmyKqvxBZgHht"
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autocrat_version: "0.1"
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budget: "200 META across 4 milestones"
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tags: [metadao, multi-option, mechanism-design, conditional-vault, passed]
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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last_updated: 2026-03-24
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---
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# MetaDAO: Develop Multi-Option Proposals?
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## Summary & Connections
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**Proposal 9 — multi-modal proposals by agrippa.** Extend futarchy from binary (pass/fail) to multiple mutually exclusive outcomes. 200 META across 4 milestones (50 each). Proposer: agrippa — former lead dev of Realms frontend at Solana Labs, Cornell crypto research, built the first conditional tokens vault on Solana.
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**Outcome:** Passed (2024-02-25).
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**Connections:**
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- This is the mechanism upgrade that enables futarchy to make selection decisions (choose among N options) not just approval decisions (yes/no). The example given — choosing a hackathon winner via conditional markets on each applicant — shows the expanded design space.
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- agrippa's insight on pork barrel: "Multi-modal proposals with a draft stage are the best solution to the deeply real game-theoretic problem of pork barrel" — anyone can add alternatives before the conditional vault goes live, forcing proposers to compete on merit
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- "Conditional markets do not compete with each other over liquidity" — this is a key technical insight that makes multi-modal proposals feasible without fragmenting liquidity
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- The self-valuation methodology is notable: agrippa estimates +12.1% DAO value from the feature (5% decision bandwidth + 5% anti-pork + 2% innovation hype + 0.1% fee revenue), then calculates the META dilution that would be worth paying. Transparent pricing of governance improvements.
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- agrippa's backstory: met Proph3t in Greece, walked 3 hours in the rain discussing futarchy. "I told him what Hanson tells people: futarchy isn't used because organizations don't actually want it." But he changed his mind — "I've realized just how fun futarchy is."
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- Related to [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] — multi-option extends the mechanism's applicability to selection problems
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---
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## Full Proposal Text
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This is a proposal to pay me (agrippa) in META to create multi-modal proposal functionality.
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As it stands proposals have two outcomes: Pass or Fail. A multi-modal proposal is one with multiple mutually-exclusive outcomes, one of which is Fail and the rest of which are other things.
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For example, you can imagine a proposal to choose the first place prize of the Solana Scribes contest, where there's a conditional market on each applicant! Without multi-modal proposals, a futarchic DAO has basically no mechanism for making choices like this, but multi-modal proposals solve it quite well.
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Architecturally speaking there is no need to hard-limit the number of conditions in a conditional vault / number of outcomes in a proposal.
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I believe even in the medium term it will prove to be a crucial feature that provides a huge amount of value to the DAO, and I believe the futarchic DAO software is currently far and away the DAO's most important asset and worth investing in.
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### Protocol complexity and risk
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Unlike other potential expansions of DAO complexity, multi-modal proposals do not particularly introduce any new security / mechanism design considerations. If you can maliciously get through "proposal option 12", you could have also gotten through Pass in a binary proposal because conditional markets do not compete with each other over liquidity.
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### About me
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I have been leading development on the Realms frontend (aka the governance-ui) for Solana Labs for the past year. Aside from smart contract dev, I'm an expert at making web3 frontends performant and developer-ergonomic. I started what was probably the very first high-school blockchain club in the world in 2014, with my then-Physics-teacher Jed who now works at Jito. In my undergrad I did research at Cornell's Initiative for Cryptocurrency and Contracts and in 2017 I was invited to a smart contract summit in China because of some Sybil resistance work I was doing at the time (Vitalik was there!).
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I developed the first conditional tokens vault on Solana as part of a prediction market reference implementation (grant-funded by FTX of all people, rest in peace). This has influenced changes to the existing metadao conditional vault, which I've been asked to help test and review.
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I met Proph3t in Greece this past December and we spent about 3 hours walking and talking in the pouring rain about the Meta-DAO and futarchy. During our conversation I told him what Hanson tells people: futarchy isn't used because organizations don't actually want it, they'd rather continue to get fat on organizational inefficiencies. But my thinking has changed!
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1. I've now seen how excited talented builders and teams are about implementing futarchy (as opposed to wanting to cling to control)
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2. I've realized just how fun futarchy is and I want it for myself regardless of anything else
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### Value
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Main points of value with subjective estimates on DAO value increase:
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- Ability to weigh multiple exclusive alternatives at once literally exponentially increases the DAO's decision-making bandwidth in relevant cases (+5%)
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- Multi-modal proposals with a draft stage are the best solution to the deeply real game-theoretic problem of pork barrel (+5%)
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- Multi-modal proposals are cool and elegant. Selection among multiple alternatives is a very challenging problem in voting mechanism design, usually solved poorly (see: elections). Multi-modal futarchic proposals are innovative and exciting not just in the context of futarchy, but all of governance! (+2%)
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- A really kickass conditional vault implementation is useful for other protocols and could collect very modest fees (+0.1%)
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Total: +12.1% value to the Meta-DAO.
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Circulating supply is 14,416 META. 14416 * 112.1% = 16160, so this feature set would be worth a dilution of +1744 META. I am proposing much less than that.
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### Compensation and Milestones
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200 META disbursed in 50 META intervals across 4 milestones:
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1. Immediately upon passage of this proposal
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2. Upon completing the (new from scratch) multi-modal conditional vault program
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3. Upon making futarch work with multi-modal conditional vaults
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4. Upon integrating all related features into the frontend
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Milestone completion assessed by a 3/5 Squads multisig: Proph3t, DeanMachine, 0xNallok, LegalizeOnionFutures, sapphire.
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Each council member paid 2.5 META upon passage.
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---
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## Raw Data
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- Proposal account: `J7dWFgSSuMg3BNZBAKYp3AD5D2yuaaLUmyKqvxBZgHht`
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- Proposal number: 9
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- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
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- Proposer: `99dZcXhrYgEmHeMKAb9ezPaBqgMdg1RjCGSfHa7BeQEX`
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- Autocrat version: 0.1
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- Completed: 2024-02-25
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[metadao]] — parent entity, mechanism upgrade
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- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] — multi-option extends futarchy to selection problems
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — extends from binary to multi-modal
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