852b5d5585
- Source: inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 2) Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
2.9 KiB
2.9 KiB
| type | entity_type | name | domain | handles | status | tracked_by | created | last_updated | category | stage | key_metrics | competitors | built_on | tags | |||||||||||||||
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| entity | company | Dean's List | internet-finance |
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active | rio | 2026-03-11 | 2026-03-11 | Services DAO — user feedback, QA, community management (Solana) | stable |
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Dean's List
Overview
Services DAO on Solana providing professional user feedback, QA, marketing, and community management services to other Solana protocols. Originally a sub-DAO of Grape Protocol. Self-describes as a "Network State" of Web3 power users. One of the early DAOs to adopt MetaDAO's futarchy governance outside of MetaDAO itself.
Current State
- Token: DEAN. Total supply capped at 100M (30M additional minted, then mint authority burned). Economic model: charge clients in USDC, use collected USDC to purchase DEAN tokens.
- Governance: Uses MetaDAO's futarchy for governance decisions. "Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model" was put through futarchy decision markets.
- Scope evolution: Beyond just feedback services — now involves broader Solana ecosystem coordination, trading community activities, AI agent token exploration.
Significance for KB
Dean's List is interesting not as a standalone company but as an adoption data point. It demonstrates that futarchy governance can be adopted by organizations outside of MetaDAO's direct ecosystem — a services DAO using market-based governance for operational decisions. If more existing DAOs migrate from Snapshot/token voting to futarchy, that validates the governance evolution thesis.
Relationship to KB
- DAO governance degenerates into political capture because proposal processes select for coalition-building skill over operational competence and the resulting bureaucracy creates structural speed disadvantages against focused competitors — Dean's List moved from token voting to futarchy to escape this
- optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles — Dean's List may use futarchy selectively for high-stakes decisions
Relevant Entities:
- metadao — governance platform
Topics:
Timeline
- 2024-06-22 — deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion proposed: $15K budget for ThailandDAO event attendance (top 5 travel, top 50 events), requiring 3% TWAP increase against $123K FDV
- 2024-06-25 — deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion failed despite favorable economics (3% threshold vs projected 1,523% FDV growth), revealing futarchy liquidity challenges on uncontested proposals