teleo-codex/inbox/archive/1965-00-00-olson-logic-of-collective-action.md
m3taversal fcc568f489 clay: address PR #64 review — backfire effect, Putnam causality, source archives
- Fix: soften backfire effect language in IPC claim — distinguish Kahan's robust finding (polarization increases with cognitive skill) from the contested backfire effect (Wood & Porter 2019, Guess & Coppock 2020 show minimal evidence)
- Fix: qualify Putnam's TV causal claim as regression decomposition with contested causal interpretation
- Add: cross-domain wiki links — Olson→alignment tax + voluntary pledges, IPC→AI alignment coordination + voluntary pledges
- Add: 6 source archive stubs for canonical academic texts (Olson, Granovetter, Dunbar, Blackmore, Putnam, Kahan)

Pentagon-Agent: Clay <D5A56E53-93FA-428D-8EC5-5BAC46E1B8C2>
2026-03-09 19:18:33 +00:00

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Markdown

---
type: source
title: "The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups"
author: "Mancur Olson"
url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Logic_of_Collective_Action
date: 1965-01-01
domain: cultural-dynamics
format: book
status: processed
processed_by: clay
processed_date: 2026-03-08
claims_extracted:
- "collective action fails by default because rational individuals free-ride on group efforts when they cannot be excluded from benefits regardless of contribution"
tags: [collective-action, free-rider, public-goods, political-economy]
---
# The Logic of Collective Action
Canonical political economy text establishing that rational self-interest leads to collective action failure in large groups. Foundational for mechanism design, governance theory, and coordination infrastructure analysis.