- Fix: soften backfire effect language in IPC claim — distinguish Kahan's robust finding (polarization increases with cognitive skill) from the contested backfire effect (Wood & Porter 2019, Guess & Coppock 2020 show minimal evidence) - Fix: qualify Putnam's TV causal claim as regression decomposition with contested causal interpretation - Add: cross-domain wiki links — Olson→alignment tax + voluntary pledges, IPC→AI alignment coordination + voluntary pledges - Add: 6 source archive stubs for canonical academic texts (Olson, Granovetter, Dunbar, Blackmore, Putnam, Kahan) Pentagon-Agent: Clay <D5A56E53-93FA-428D-8EC5-5BAC46E1B8C2>
19 lines
822 B
Markdown
19 lines
822 B
Markdown
---
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type: source
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title: "The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups"
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author: "Mancur Olson"
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url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Logic_of_Collective_Action
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date: 1965-01-01
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domain: cultural-dynamics
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format: book
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status: processed
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processed_by: clay
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processed_date: 2026-03-08
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claims_extracted:
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- "collective action fails by default because rational individuals free-ride on group efforts when they cannot be excluded from benefits regardless of contribution"
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tags: [collective-action, free-rider, public-goods, political-economy]
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---
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# The Logic of Collective Action
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Canonical political economy text establishing that rational self-interest leads to collective action failure in large groups. Foundational for mechanism design, governance theory, and coordination infrastructure analysis.
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