extract: 2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy

Pentagon-Agent: Ganymede <F99EBFA6-547B-4096-BEEA-1D59C3E4028A>

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md

@@ -65,6 +65,18 @@ Sanctum's Wonder proposal (2frDGSg1frwBeh3bc6R7XKR2wckyMTt6pGXLGLPgoota, created
 
 Dean's List DAO proposal (DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM) used Autocrat v0.3 with 3-day trading period and 3% TWAP threshold. Proposal completed 2024-06-25 with failed status. This provides concrete implementation data: small DAOs (FDV $123K) can deploy Autocrat with custom TWAP thresholds (3% vs. typical higher thresholds), but low absolute dollar amounts may be insufficient to attract trader participation even when percentage returns are favorable.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Autocrat v0.1 made the three-day window configurable rather than hardcoded, with the proposer stating it was 'most importantly' designed to 'allow for quicker feedback loops.' The proposal passed with 990K META migrated, demonstrating community acceptance of parameterized proposal duration.
+
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2024-07-04-futardio-proposal-proposal-3]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Proposal #3 on MetaDAO (account EXehk1u3qUJZSxJ4X3nHsiTocRhzwq3eQAa6WKxeJ8Xs) ran on Autocrat version 0.3, created 2024-07-04, and completed/ended 2024-07-08 - confirming the four-day operational window (proposal creation plus three-day settlement period) specified in the mechanism design.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md

@@ -35,6 +35,12 @@ FitByte ICO attracted only $23 in total commitments against a $500,000 target be
 
 Dean's List ThailandDAO proposal (DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM) failed on 2024-06-25 despite projecting 16x FDV increase with only 3% TWAP threshold required. The proposal explicitly calculated that $73.95 per-participant value creation across 50 participants would meet the threshold, yet failed to attract sufficient trading volume. This extends the 'limited trading volume' pattern from uncontested decisions to contested-but-favorable proposals, suggesting the participation problem is broader than initial observations indicated.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2024-07-04-futardio-proposal-proposal-3]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Proposal #3 failed with no indication of trading activity or market participation in the on-chain data, consistent with the pattern of minimal engagement in proposals without controversy or competitive dynamics.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-proposer-liquidity-lockup-requirement-creates-spam-filter-and-initial-price-discovery-mechanism.md

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-domain: internet-finance
-description: Requiring proposers to lock initial liquidity and set starting prices prevents frivolous proposals while establishing market baseline
-confidence: experimental
-source: MetaDAO proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG
-created: 2026-03-15
----
-
-# AMM futarchy proposer liquidity lockup requirement creates spam filter and initial price discovery mechanism
-
-The proposal states 'these types of proposals would also require that the proposer lock-up some initial liquidity, and set the starting price for the pass/fail markets.' This serves dual functions: economic spam prevention and price anchoring. The lockup requirement means proposers must commit capital to launch proposals, replacing the CLOB's '1 META minimum order size' spam filter with a more substantial barrier. The starting price setting gives proposers the ability to anchor initial market expectations based on their private information, after which 'someone would swap and move the AMM price to their preferred price, and then provide liquidity at that price since the fee incentives are high.' This creates a natural progression from proposer signal to market validation to liquidity provision.
-
----
-
-Relevant Notes:
-- amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md
-
-Topics:
-- [[_map]]

domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-by-99-percent-versus-clob-by-eliminating-orderbook-storage-requirements.md

@@ -21,12 +21,6 @@ This cost differential becomes material at scale: a DAO running 50 proposals ann
 - AMM state requirements described as "almost nothing"
 - State rent recovery requires autocrat program migration (feedback section)
 
-
-### Additional Evidence (confirm)
-*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
-
-Proposal provides specific cost data: CLOB pairs cost 3.75 SOL in state rent per market, totaling 135-225 SOL annually ($11,475-$19,125 at 2024 prices) for 3-5 proposals per month, while 'AMMs cost almost nothing in state rent'
-
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-from-135-225-sol-annually-to-near-zero-by-replacing-clob-market-pairs.md

@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ This cost reduction is structural, not marginal—the CLOB architecture requires
 
 The 94-99% cost reduction (from 135-225 SOL to near-zero) makes futarchy economically viable at higher proposal frequencies, removing a constraint on governance throughput.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Proposal provides specific cost calculation: 'If we average 3-5 proposals per month, then annual costs for market creation is 135-225 SOL, or $11475-$19125 at current prices. AMMs cost almost nothing in state rent.' Each pass/fail market pair costs 3.75 SOL in state rent that cannot currently be recouped.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-replacing-midpoint-price-with-capital-commitment-weighting.md

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-domain: internet-finance
-description: The metric aggregates price updates weighted by liquidity depth at each swap creating manipulation resistance through capital requirements
-confidence: experimental
-source: MetaDAO proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG
-created: 2026-03-15
----
-
-# AMM futarchy uses liquidity-weighted price over time as settlement metric replacing midpoint price with capital commitment weighting
-
-The proposal specifies that AMMs track 'liquidity-weighted price over time' where 'the more liquidity that is on the books, the more weight the current price of the pass or fail market is given. Every time there is a swap, these metrics are updated/aggregated.' This differs from CLOB midpoint pricing by making price manipulation proportional to liquidity provision rather than order placement. The mechanism creates a direct cost for moving the settlement price: an attacker must either provide substantial liquidity at their desired price point or execute large swaps that move price against existing liquidity. The proposal explicitly notes this solves CLOB manipulation where 'someone with 1 $META can push the midpoint towards the current best bid/ask' by requiring capital commitment proportional to desired price influence.
-
----
-
-Relevant Notes:
-- liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md
-- amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md
-
-Topics:
-- [[_map]]

domains/internet-finance/futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md

@@ -35,6 +35,12 @@ This pattern is general. Since [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token pri
 - MetaDAO's current scale ($219M total futarchy marketcap) may be too small to attract sophisticated attacks that the removed mechanisms were designed to prevent
 - Hanson might argue that MetaDAO's version isn't really futarchy at all — just conditional prediction markets used for governance, which is a narrower claim
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+MetaDAO's Autocrat v0.1 simplified by making proposal slots configurable and reducing default duration to 3 days. The proposer explicitly framed this as enabling 'quicker feedback loops,' suggesting the original implementation's fixed duration was a practical barrier to adoption.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-creates-wide-spreads-because-pricing-counterfactual-governance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ This connects to [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume
 ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
 *Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
 
-Proposal identifies that 'estimating a fair price for the future value of MetaDao under pass/fail conditions is difficult, and most reasonable estimates will have a wide range. This uncertainty discourages people from risking their funds with limit orders near the midpoint price, and has the effect of reducing liquidity (and trading).'
+MetaDAO's AMM migration proposal explicitly identifies lack of liquidity as the main reason for switching from CLOBs: 'Estimating a fair price for the future value of MetaDao under pass/fail conditions is difficult, and most reasonable estimates will have a wide range. This uncertainty discourages people from risking their funds with limit orders near the midpoint price, and has the effect of reducing liquidity (and trading).'
 
 ---
 

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-incentive-programs-use-multisig-execution-groups-as-discretionary-override.md

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: Human judgment layer resolves ambiguity in automated reward systems while maintaining credible commitment
+confidence: experimental
+source: Drift Futarchy proposal execution structure
+created: 2026-03-15
+---
+
+# Futarchy incentive programs use multisig execution groups as discretionary override because pure algorithmic distribution cannot handle edge cases or gaming attempts
+
+The Drift proposal establishes a 2/3 multisig execution group (metaprophet, Sumatt, Lmvdzande) to distribute the 50,000 DRIFT budget according to the outlined rules. Critically, the proposal grants this group discretion in two areas: (1) determining 'exact criteria' for the activity pool to filter non-organic participation, and (2) deciding which proposals qualify if successful proposals exceed the budget. The group also receives 3,000 DRIFT for their work and has authority to return excess funds to the treasury. This structure acknowledges that pure algorithmic distribution fails when faced with gaming, ambiguous cases, or unforeseen circumstances. The multisig provides a credible commitment mechanism - the proposal passes based on general principles, but execution requires human judgment. The group composition (known futarchy advocates) provides reputational accountability.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance.md
+
+Topics:
+- [[_map]]

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposer-incentives-require-delayed-vesting-to-prevent-gaming.md

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: Three-month clawback period filters for proposals that create lasting value versus short-term manipulation
+confidence: experimental
+source: Drift Futarchy proposal structure
+created: 2026-03-15
+---
+
+# Futarchy proposer incentives require delayed vesting to prevent gaming because immediate rewards enable proposal spam for token extraction rather than quality governance
+
+The Drift proposal structures proposer rewards with a three-month delay between proposal passage and token claim. Passing proposals earn up to 5,000 DRIFT each, but tokens are only claimable after three months. This delay creates a quality filter: proposers must believe their proposals will create sustained value that survives the vesting period. Without this delay, rational actors could spam low-quality proposals to extract rewards, knowing they can exit before negative effects manifest. The proposal also includes an executor group discretion clause - if successful proposals exceed expectations, the group can decide which top N proposals split the allocation. This combines time-based filtering with human judgment to prevent gaming. The 20,000 DRIFT activity pool uses the same three-month delay, with criteria finalized by the execution group to 'filter for non organic activity.'
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
+- performance-unlocked-team-tokens-with-price-multiple-triggers-and-twap-settlement-create-long-term-alignment-without-initial-dilution.md
+
+Topics:
+- [[_map]]

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-retroactive-rewards-bootstrap-participation-through-endowment-effect.md

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: Token distributions to historical participants leverage behavioral economics to seed active markets
+confidence: experimental
+source: Drift Futarchy proposal, endowment effect literature
+created: 2026-03-15
+---
+
+# Futarchy retroactive rewards bootstrap participation through endowment effect by converting past engagement into token holdings that create psychological ownership
+
+The Drift Futarchy incentive program explicitly uses retroactive token distribution to MetaDAO participants as a mechanism to bootstrap engagement. The proposal cites the endowment effect - the behavioral economics finding that people value things more highly once they own them - as the theoretical basis. By distributing 9,600 DRIFT to 32 MetaDAO participants based on historical activity (5+ interactions over 30+ days), plus 2,400 DRIFT to AMM swappers, the proposal creates a cohort of token holders who have psychological ownership before the futarchy system launches. This differs from standard airdrops by explicitly targeting demonstrated forecasters rather than broad distribution. The tiered structure (100-400 DRIFT based on META holdings) further segments by engagement level. The proposal pairs this with forward incentives (5,000 DRIFT per passing proposal, 20,000 DRIFT activity pool) to convert initial ownership into sustained participation.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md
+
+Topics:
+- [[_map]]

domains/internet-finance/high-fee-amms-3-5-percent-deter-wash-trading-manipulation-while-incentivizing-passive-liquidity-provision.md

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-domain: internet-finance
-description: The fee structure creates asymmetric costs where active trading is expensive but passive provision is profitable
-confidence: experimental
-source: MetaDAO proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG
-created: 2026-03-15
----
-
-# High fee AMMs 3-5 percent deter wash trading manipulation while incentivizing passive liquidity provision
-
-The proposal specifies 'by setting a high fee (3-5%) we can both: encourage LPs, and aggressively discourage wash-trading and manipulation.' This creates a cost asymmetry: wash traders attempting to manipulate the liquidity-weighted price metric must pay 3-5% on each trade, making repeated manipulation expensive, while liquidity providers earn these fees passively. The mechanism addresses the CLOB vulnerability where 'VWAP can be manipulated by wash trading' by making the cost of manipulation proportional to trading volume. A manipulator moving price through wash trades pays cumulative fees that LPs capture, creating a profitable defense opportunity similar to the general futarchy property that 'attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders.'
-
----
-
-Relevant Notes:
-- high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md
-- liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-wash-trading-costs-because-high-fees-make-price-movement-expensive.md
-
-Topics:
-- [[_map]]

domains/internet-finance/high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md

@@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ The mechanism depends on futarchy-specific conditions (short duration, governanc
 - May reduce legitimate trading volume
 - LP attraction depends on base trading activity
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Proposal specifies 3-5% fee structure with dual purpose: 'By setting a high fee (3-5%) we can both: encourage LPs, and aggressively discourage wash-trading and manipulation.' The high fee makes liquidity provision profitable while making repeated trading for manipulation purposes expensive.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/metadao-autocrat-migration-accepted-counterparty-risk-from-unverifiable-builds-prioritizing-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees.md

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: Community approved treasury migration despite inability to verify program builds, revealing governance tradeoffs
+confidence: experimental
+source: MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 proposal risk disclosure, December 2023
+created: 2026-03-15
+---
+
+# MetaDAO Autocrat migration accepted counterparty risk from unverifiable builds prioritizing iteration speed over security guarantees
+
+The proposal explicitly disclosed that the new Autocrat program "was unable to build with solana-verifiable-build" and required "placing trust in me that I didn't introduce a backdoor." Despite this counterparty risk affecting 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL, the proposal passed. The proposer acknowledged this as a temporary compromise, stating "for future versions, I should always be able to use verifiable builds." This reveals a critical governance tradeoff: the MetaDAO community valued faster iteration and improved functionality (configurable proposal slots, 3-day default) over the security guarantee of verifiable builds. The decision suggests early-stage futarchy DAOs prioritize mechanism refinement over security hardening, accepting elevated trust assumptions to compress development cycles. This pattern may not generalize to mature DAOs or larger treasuries, but demonstrates that governance communities will accept temporary centralization when the alternative is slower evolution of the governance mechanism itself.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md
+- futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
+
+Topics:
+- [[_map]]

domains/internet-finance/metadao-autocrat-v01-reduces-proposal-duration-to-three-days-enabling-faster-governance-iteration.md

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: Configurable proposal slots with three-day default compress feedback loops in futarchy governance
+confidence: experimental
+source: MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 proposal, December 2023
+created: 2026-03-15
+---
+
+# MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 reduces proposal duration to three days enabling faster governance iteration
+
+The Autocrat v0.1 upgrade introduces configurable slots per proposal with a default of 3 days, explicitly designed to "allow for quicker feedback loops." This represents a significant reduction from previous implementations and addresses a key friction point in futarchy adoption: the time cost of decision-making. The proposal passed and migrated 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL to the new program, demonstrating community acceptance of faster iteration cycles. The architectural change makes proposal duration a parameter rather than a constant, allowing MetaDAO to tune the speed-quality tradeoff based on empirical results. This matters because governance mechanism adoption depends on matching decision velocity to organizational needs—too slow and participants route around the system, too fast and markets cannot aggregate information effectively.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md
+- futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
+
+Topics:
+- [[_map]]

entities/internet-finance/metadao.md

@@ -60,6 +60,10 @@ The futarchy governance protocol on Solana. Implements decision markets through
 - **2025-01-30** — [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-2]] passed: Theia acquires 370.370 META tokens for $500,000 USDC
 - **2023-11-18** — [[metadao-develop-lst-vote-market]] proposed: first product development proposal requesting 3,000 META to build Votium-style validator bribe platform for MNDE/mSOL holders
 - **2023-11-29** — [[metadao-develop-lst-vote-market]] passed: approved LST Vote Market development with projected $10.5M enterprise value addition
+- **2023-12-03** — Proposed Autocrat v0.1 migration with configurable proposal slots and 3-day default duration
+- **2023-12-13** — Completed Autocrat v0.1 migration, moving 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL to new program despite unverifiable build
+- **2024-01-24** — Proposed AMM program to replace CLOB markets, addressing liquidity fragmentation and state rent costs (Proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG)
+- **2024-01-29** — AMM proposal passed with 400 META on approval and 800 META on completion budget
 ## Key Decisions
 | Date | Proposal | Proposer | Category | Outcome |
 |------|----------|----------|----------|---------|

inbox/archive/.extraction-debug/2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.json

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+{
+  "rejected_claims": [
+    {
+      "filename": "amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-eliminating-midpoint-manipulation-vulnerability.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "filename": "amm-futarchy-proposer-liquidity-lockup-requirement-bootstraps-initial-market-depth-and-filters-spam-proposals.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "filename": "amm-futarchy-enables-granular-trading-below-minimum-order-sizes-that-clob-spam-filters-require.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "filename": "amm-futarchy-permissionless-market-closure-returns-state-rent-after-positions-are-withdrawn.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "validation_stats": {
+    "total": 4,
+    "kept": 0,
+    "fixed": 9,
+    "rejected": 4,
+    "fixes_applied": [
+      "amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-eliminating-midpoint-manipulation-vulnerability.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
+      "amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-eliminating-midpoint-manipulation-vulnerability.md:stripped_wiki_link:liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulat",
+      "amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-eliminating-midpoint-manipulation-vulnerability.md:stripped_wiki_link:high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent",
+      "amm-futarchy-proposer-liquidity-lockup-requirement-bootstraps-initial-market-depth-and-filters-spam-proposals.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
+      "amm-futarchy-proposer-liquidity-lockup-requirement-bootstraps-initial-market-depth-and-filters-spam-proposals.md:stripped_wiki_link:amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentive",
+      "amm-futarchy-enables-granular-trading-below-minimum-order-sizes-that-clob-spam-filters-require.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
+      "amm-futarchy-enables-granular-trading-below-minimum-order-sizes-that-clob-spam-filters-require.md:stripped_wiki_link:amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-sett",
+      "amm-futarchy-permissionless-market-closure-returns-state-rent-after-positions-are-withdrawn.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
+      "amm-futarchy-permissionless-market-closure-returns-state-rent-after-positions-are-withdrawn.md:stripped_wiki_link:amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-by-99-percent-versus-c"
+    ],
+    "rejections": [
+      "amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-eliminating-midpoint-manipulation-vulnerability.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
+      "amm-futarchy-proposer-liquidity-lockup-requirement-bootstraps-initial-market-depth-and-filters-spam-proposals.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
+      "amm-futarchy-enables-granular-trading-below-minimum-order-sizes-that-clob-spam-filters-require.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
+      "amm-futarchy-permissionless-market-closure-returns-state-rent-after-positions-are-withdrawn.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
+    ]
+  },
+  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
+  "date": "2026-03-15"
+}

inbox/archive/2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01.md

@@ -6,9 +6,14 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9z
 date: 2023-12-03
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-15
+claims_extracted: ["metadao-autocrat-v01-reduces-proposal-duration-to-three-days-enabling-faster-governance-iteration.md", "metadao-autocrat-migration-accepted-counterparty-risk-from-unverifiable-builds-prioritizing-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees.md"]
+enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md", "futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -63,3 +68,12 @@ For future versions, I should always be able to use verifiable builds.
 - Autocrat version: 0
 - Completed: 2023-12-13
 - Ended: 2023-12-13
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 proposal created 2023-12-03, completed 2023-12-13
+- Proposal migrated 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL from first to second Autocrat program
+- Autocrat v0.1 default proposal duration is 3 days
+- Proposal account: AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi
+- DAO account: 3wDJ5g73ABaDsL1qofF5jJqEJU4RnRQrvzRLkSnFc5di
+- Autocrat v0.1 could not use solana-verifiable-build for undisclosed reasons

inbox/archive/2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md

@@ -6,13 +6,12 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1P
 date: 2024-01-24
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: processed
+status: enrichment
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 processed_by: rio
 processed_date: 2026-03-15
-claims_extracted: ["amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-replacing-midpoint-price-with-capital-commitment-weighting.md", "amm-futarchy-proposer-liquidity-lockup-requirement-creates-spam-filter-and-initial-price-discovery-mechanism.md", "high-fee-amms-3-5-percent-deter-wash-trading-manipulation-while-incentivizing-passive-liquidity-provision.md"]
-enrichments_applied: ["amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-by-99-percent-versus-clob-by-eliminating-orderbook-storage-requirements.md", "futarchy-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-creates-wide-spreads-because-pricing-counterfactual-governance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md"]
+enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-creates-wide-spreads-because-pricing-counterfactual-governance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md", "amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-from-135-225-sol-annually-to-near-zero-by-replacing-clob-market-pairs.md", "high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md"]
 extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
@@ -136,11 +135,11 @@ Any important changes or feedback brought up during the proposal vote will be re
 
 
 ## Key Facts
-- MetaDAO CLOB markets cost 3.75 SOL in state rent per pass/fail market pair
-- MetaDAO averages 3-5 proposals per month as of January 2024
-- Annual state rent costs for CLOB markets: 135-225 SOL ($11,475-$19,125 at January 2024 prices)
-- AMM proposal budget: 400 META on passing, 800 META on completion
-- AMM implementation timeline: 3 weeks development + 1 week review
-- Proposal contributors: joebuild (program), 0xNalloK (frontend), TBD (review)
-- CLOB minimum order size: 1 META (spam filter)
-- Proposed AMM fee range: 3-5%
+- MetaDAO proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG passed on 2024-01-29
+- Budget was 400 META on passing proposal plus 800 META on completed migration
+- Implementation timeline estimated at 3 weeks from passing plus 1 week review
+- joebuild wrote program changes, 0xNalloK handled frontend integration
+- MetaDAO Autocrat version 0.1 was in use at time of proposal
+- Current CLOB minimum order size is 1 META
+- Pass/fail market pairs cost 3.75 SOL in state rent under CLOB system
+- Proposal included feature to revert to fail after X days if proposal instruction does not work

inbox/archive/2024-02-05-futardio-proposal-execute-creation-of-spot-market-for-meta.md

@@ -6,9 +6,12 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/HyA2h16uPQBFjezKf77wThNGsEoesUjeQf9rFvfAy4t
 date: 2024-02-05
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-15
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -61,3 +64,12 @@ Obviously, there is no algorithmic guarantee that the multisig members will actu
 - Autocrat version: 0.1
 - Completed: 2024-02-10
 - Ended: 2024-02-10
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- MetaDAO Proposal 5 passed on 2024-02-05 and completed on 2024-02-10
+- The proposal transferred 4,130 META to a 4/6 multisig: 3,100 META for sale participants, 1,000 META for liquidity pool, 30 META for multisig compensation (5 META each)
+- Initial META spot price was set at 35 USDC/META through the liquidity pool pairing
+- Multisig members were Proph3t, Dean, Nallok, Durden, Rar3, and BlockchainFixesThis
+- Participants had a 2-day window (Feb 5-7) to transfer USDC for their allocations
+- The liquidity pool was likely created on Meteora

inbox/archive/2024-02-18-futardio-proposal-engage-in-100000-otc-trade-with-ben-hawkins-2.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/E1FJAp8saDU6Da2ccayjLBfA53qbjKRNYvu7QiMAnjQ
 date: 2024-02-18
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 processed_by: rio
@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ processed_date: 2024-02-18
 enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-governed-DAOs-converge-on-traditional-corporate-governance-scaffolding-for-treasury-operations-because-market-mechanisms-alone-cannot-provide-operational-security-and-legal-compliance.md", "MetaDAOs-Autocrat-program-implements-futarchy-through-conditional-token-markets-where-proposals-create-parallel-pass-and-fail-universes-settled-by-time-weighted-average-price-over-a-three-day-window.md", "futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirements.md", "time-based-token-vesting-is-hedgeable-making-standard-lockups-meaningless-as-alignment-mechanisms-because-investors-can-short-sell-to-neutralize-lockup-exposure-while-appearing-locked.md"]
 extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 extraction_notes: "Failed MetaDAO proposal for $100k OTC trade. Extracted two claims: (1) the vesting mechanism design for managing large token sales, (2) the market rejection despite acknowledged liquidity need. Four enrichments confirm existing claims about futarchy scaffolding, TWAP usage, adoption friction, and vesting limitations. The proposal's failure is particularly interesting as evidence of futarchy rejecting a solution to a stated problem, suggesting the mechanism can distinguish between 'we have a problem' and 'this solution is net positive.'"
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-15
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -157,3 +160,15 @@ Here are some post-money valuations at different prices as well total increase i
 - Multisig: 6 members, 4/6 threshold (Proph3t, Dean, 0xNallok, Durden, Blockchainfixesthis, Rar3)
 - Projected circulating supply increase: 2-7%
 - Projected META value increase: ~15%
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- MetaDAO Proposal 8 created 2024-02-18, failed 2024-02-24
+- Proposal sought $100k USDC for up to 500 META tokens at max(twapPass, $200)
+- META spot price was $695.92 on 2024-02-18 20:20 UTC
+- META circulating supply was 14,530 tokens at proposal time
+- Proposal structure: 20% immediate transfer, 80% linear vest over 12 months via Streamflow
+- Multisig: 6 members (Proph3t, Dean, 0xNallok, Durden, Blockchainfixesthis, Rar3) with 4/6 threshold
+- Projected circulating supply increase: 2-7% depending on final price
+- Projected META value increase: ~15% from liquidity injection
+- Proposal included $2,000 USDC compensation for multisig members

inbox/archive/2024-07-04-futardio-proposal-proposal-3.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/EXehk1u3qUJZSxJ4X3nHsiTocRhzwq3eQAa6WKxeJ8X
 date: 2024-07-04
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 processed_by: rio
@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ processed_date: 2024-12-10
 enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md", "MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md"]
 extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 extraction_notes: "Structured data from a failed MetaDAO proposal. No new claims warranted - this is factual evidence of the futarchy mechanism in operation. Enriches existing claims about MetaDAO's Autocrat implementation with concrete on-chain data and timeline. The source contains only verifiable facts about proposal metadata, not arguable propositions."
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-15
+enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md", "MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -42,3 +46,12 @@ extraction_notes: "Structured data from a failed MetaDAO proposal. No new claims
 - Proposal created: 2024-07-04
 - Proposal completed and ended: 2024-07-08
 - Proposal status: Failed
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- MetaDAO Proposal #3 account: EXehk1u3qUJZSxJ4X3nHsiTocRhzwq3eQAa6WKxeJ8Xs
+- MetaDAO DAO account: GWywkp2mY2vzAaLydR2MBXRCqk2vBTyvtVRioujxi5Ce
+- Proposal #3 proposer: HwBL75xHHKcXSMNcctq3UqWaEJPDWVQz6NazZJNjWaQc
+- Proposal #3 used Autocrat version 0.3
+- Proposal #3 status: Failed
+- Proposal #3 timeline: Created 2024-07-04, Completed and Ended 2024-07-08